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ABSTRACT
The Arab Quest for Modernity: Universal Impulses vs. State development
by
Kevin Wampler Jones
The Arab Middle East began indigenous nation building relatively late in the twentieth
century. Issues of legitimacy, identity, and conflicts with the West have plagued Arab
nations. Arab states have espoused universal ideologies as solutions to the problems of
Arab nation building.

The two ideologies of Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism provided universal solutions
to the Arab states. Both Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism gained validity in political
polemics aimed against colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, and the West. Both ideologies
promised simple solutions to complex questions of building modern Arab society.
Irrespective of ideology, Arab states have always acted in self-interest to perceived
external threats. The West has perpetuated universal solutions to Arab nation building
through continued intervention in the Middle East. The Arabs perpetuated universal
solutions to Arab- nation building as panacea to the problems of becoming modern
nations.

2

©
Copyright, 2007 Kevin Wampler Jones
All Rights Reserved

3

DEDICATION
This Thesis would not be possible without the support of my loving wife, Amanda
Parsons Jones. In addition, my parents have supported me unconditionally in all my
endeavors.

4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my thesis chair, Dr. Leila S. Al-Imad, for constantly
expanding my knowledge of the Middle East and refining my Arabic language skills. Dr.
Al-Imad has patiently watched my thesis evolve from a conference paper and has
provided many books that contributed to the argument. Also, Dr. Stephen Fritz and Dr.
Melvin Page of my thesis committee have been instrumental in developing my skill at
crafting a historical argument and refining my ideas. I would like to thank my entire
thesis committee for constantly challenging me to improve and always providing
valuable historical insight. In addition, Dr. Doug Burgess has provided me with practical
and theoretical advice on numerous occasions. Lastly, I would like to thank the entire
ETSU History Department for providing me the opportunity to teach, work, and learn
through their guidance.

5

CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………….2
COPYRIGHT……………………………………………………………………………...3
DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………….4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………….....5

Chapter
1. OUTLINING THE MODERN ARAB STATE……………………………………7
2. FRAMING A FALSE DICHOTOMY: SATI AL-HUSRI AND HASSAN ALBANNA…………………………………………………………………………..20
3. SUCCESS BY ASSOCIATION 1860-1948: ARAB POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT FROM 1860 TO THE MANDATE PERIOD………………..32
4. POST-COLONIAL ARAB POLITICS 1949-1956………………………………44
5. NASSERISM: 1955-1967 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PAN-ARAB
MOVEMENT…………………………………………………………………….54
6. THE BA’TH PARTY: PAN-ARAB DREAMS TO TRIBALIST STATES……..63
7. POST-ARABISM: NEW UNIVERSAL POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES………….72
8. THE WEST AND ISRAEL IN ARAB POLITICS………………………………84
9. CONCLUSION: UNIVERSAL RESPONSES TO OMNIPRESENT
THREATS………………………………………………………………………...93
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………...101
VITA………………………………………………………………………………...109

6

CHAPTER 1
OUTLINING THE MODERN ARAB STATE

The question that Middle Eastern political leaders, historians, sociologists, and
anthropologists are trying to solve is the role of identity in Arab state formation. Western
Europe has submitted to the nation state since the beginning of the enlightenment;
however, the Arab Middle East has only comparatively recently shed the yoke of the
universal1 Ottoman Empire. Even before the advent of the industrial and French
revolutions, Europe had a long tradition of state building that centered on linguistic,
geographic, and cultural lines. Yet, even in Europe, the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic
empires persisted until after their defeat in WWI. The Arab Middle East was a part of a
multi ethnic and non-Arab empire that has only been independent since roughly 19502.
Thus, complications exist in comparing Arab state formation to Europe. Consequently,
unclear models exist in explaining the development of Arab ethnic states. Furthermore,
the Arab nationalists have had difficulty in defining the state. Regardless, the temptation
to label the Arab nations in a delayed development between the enlightenment and
modernity depends on inadequate arguments. The Arab Middle East exists in a region
where the national identity is in flux. Consequently, the populations of Arab states have
divided political loyalties that presented and currently impede state formation. Although
the West today is a multi-cultural and a multi-ethnic entity, the population generally
submits to the overall idea of the state society. Westerners largely do not question the

1

Universal in the sense that it did not predicate its existence on any specific ethnicity, ideology, or
practice but simply wherever the army could expand. The later use of universal in this paper pertains to the
specific use of Arabism or Islam to create a state with one over-riding identity.
2
Some states were “more” independent earlier and others were foreign dominated into the 1960’s
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underlying principles of their societies and have minor variations in mainstream opinion
on topics of economic or social concern, whereas the Arab Middle East has increasingly
incompatible political identities competing in a deadly struggle to define society.
The Arab Middle East has three general types of state identity: Arab nationalist
identity, religious identity, or a royal family identity. The Arab nationalist identity is the
predominate form of identity among political elites in the most significant Arab states.
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq became states with the concept of an Arab identity based on
language, ethnicity, and in some instances religion. The Pan-Arab nationalist movement
was a competition between Syria, Iraq, and Egypt and set a precedent for external
influence on other states affairs.3 The Arab nationalist movement during Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s leadership of Egypt achieved its greatest political power but has steadily been
declining since the late 1960s. The Ba’th Arab nationalist states of Iraq and Syria
abandoned their last unity project in 1978-1979. The Arab nationalist nations have given
up on the grandiose vision of the Pan-Arab nationalist state that would promote universal
Arab unity. Regardless, Arab states use the failure to define Arab identity as justification
for the existence of the post-colonial status quo and to give the arbitrary boundaries of the
Middle East some credibility.4
The Islamic identity has superseded the Arab nationalist identity in most of the
Middle Eastern countries and has promoted the universalistic approaches of radical
fundamentalism. The Islamists play down ethnic identity in favor of a Muslim Umma
centered on traditional Islamic values. The Iranian revolution, although not an Arab
revolution, shocked the West with the power of resurgent Islam and the threat to “export”
3

Quamiyya nationalism implied Pan-Arab unity, but the debate became who would lead the
movement.
4
Alan R. Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 43-77.
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the revolution. Iran has had success in promoting Shi’a political, religious, and
philosophical thought. Iran has backed Shi’a political movements in many of the Gulf
states, Iraq, and southern Lebanon. Iran interfered in Iraqi politics by supporting Mustafa
al-Barzani in his attempt to create a Kurdistan before 1975 and by promoting radical
Imams in Southern Iraq during the 1979 revolution. In addition, there are radical Sunni
religious groups that have operated underground for years in Egypt, Syria, and other
Middle Eastern states. Ikhwan Al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan
Al-Banna in Egypt operated underground in Egypt and other Arab states. The Islamists
differ on approaches to revolution and ideology but generally rely on charismatic
leadership of religious elites that has mobilized the masses of society.5
Gulf Sheikdoms are small monarchies created based on patronage with Imperialist
powers and are dependent on outside assistance to maintain their status. The British
created the Sheikdoms in order to maintain favorable governments in the Middle East
after their departure and prevent potentially powerful Arab states from forming true to the
principle of “Divide and Rule”. The United States inherited the British role in protecting
the Sheikdoms and maintaining their status through defense treaties and economic
patronage. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), an American creation, was created
primarily as a political body to strengthen the Sheikdoms regionally and promote
stability. Despite the existence of the GCC, internal Islamist movements push for popular
government that plagues many of the Gulf states. The GCC states do not necessarily have
an identity but provide economic benefit for their population, which translates into
stability. The GCC is naturally limited to oil rich monarchies. The Sheikdoms would not
5

John J. Donohue, “Islam and the Search for Identity in the Arab World,” in Voices of Resurgent
Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 48-61.
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likely survive in the Middle East without the continued support from outside powers. The
larger Arab states and Iran have all attempted to absorb or exert influence over GCC
states. The GCC states have been specific targets of Iraqi and Iranian expansion in the
past. In addition, the GCC provides the funding of many Islamic movements8 because of
the petrol-dollars.6
The pre-modern political development in Europe and the Arab Middle East
provided the forms of identity that would result in the failure of Pan-Arabism as a
political platform and ideology. Unlike Western Europe in the modern-period, the Arabs
have yet to create an ethnic based nationalism to unite the various Arab states. The
comparisons of Arabs to nineteenth century Europeans frozen in a nationalistic
developmental state have provided little insight into the reasons behind the failure of
Arab nationalism. Western rationalism has categorized nationalism as a necessary
precursor to modernization. However, rationalism cannot explain entirely the apparent
advancement of Arabs past Europeans through the Middle Ages, then their lapse and
decline in the late seventeenth century. Arab polemicist attribute Arab decline to the
steppe nomads who assumed power and corrupted the Arab empires. Historically it is
hard to deny that the influx of Mongols and their sack of Baghdad in the late middle Ages
set the Arab empire at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Western Europe. Yet, Turkish power over
the majority of Arabs does not yield an immediate lapse in Empire but rather expands the
horizon of the Muslim empire until the reversal at Vienna in 1683. Thus, perhaps the lack

6

Gulf Cooperation Council “The GCC Charter”. http://www.gcc-sg.org/CHARTER.html [Jan.

2006]
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of development of Arab nationalism lies in the development of state based politics and
ideology.7 According to Alan Taylor,

The Arab world’s historical legacy is a blend of unifying and divisive
forces combined with a profound psychological concern over the impact
of these forces on the destiny of the Arabs as a group. Regionalism is a
deeply rooted predisposition related to history and geography. The great
early civilizations in the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, and the Maghreb left a
cultural heritage which can never be completely erased, and the Arabian
Peninsula also has traditions which go back thousands of years. Likewise,
each of these areas has a distinctive physical environment that has
determined the economic and social orientation of the respective
inhabitants.8

Ironically, the Arab conception of the Umma preceded European state
development by several hundred years. Muhammad envisioned the Umma as a semisocialist polity of believers as part of a religion that performed the political, social, and
economic functions of state. The Umma from its inception implied the concepts of state
that Rousseau would articulate much later in Western Europe. Ironically, the concept of
the Umma was much more flexible than the theories of state that prevailed in Western
Europe. The Umma was more inclusive in terms of religions and had a millet system that

7
8

Taylor, 1-6.
Taylor, 5.
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allowed religious minorities to function within the state.9 Europe, by contrast, developed
arbitrary and absolute forms of identity. Identity in Europe became nearly formulaic by
the 19th century and citizenship implied ethnic affiliation as well as association with
arbitrary boundaries. Charles Tilly claimed,

The structure which became dominant in Europe after 1500, the national
state, differed from these alternative possibilities in several significant
ways: (1) it controlled a well-defined, continuous territory; (2) it was
relatively centralized; (3) it was differentiated from other organizations;
(4) it reinforced its claims through a tendency to acquire a monopoly over
the concentrated means of physical coercion within its territory.10

The Umma was strictly a Muslim polity with some provisions governing the rule and
regulations for both religious and ethnic participation in government, society, and basic
daily life. The primary divide in the Umma was the Sh’ite branch of Islam that
undermined the Sunni monopoly on the law that was codified in the tenth century. The
Sunni and Shi’ite divide remains the largest rift in the Umma. However, the Umma
generally allowed non-threatening religious minorities to exist and recognized their place
in the society. The flexible identity of the Arab-Muslim world and the tribal traditions of
the Arab society created a flexible and de-centralized system of government. European
state development created an absolute centralized concept of identity centered on unity of

9

See for Arab ideas of state legitimacy Nazih N.M.Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab state: politics
and society in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), 21-24.
10
Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in The Formation of
National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 27.
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individuals, thought, and custom that allowed little deviance from the dominate political
body.11 Kemal Karpat claimed, “The Muslim community encompassed a great number of
ethnic and linguistic groups. Before it became a predominately imperial entity, the early
Ottoman state recognized these ethnic divisions. Islamic doctrine explicitly recognizes
ethnic and tribal differences (in the famous sura 49:13), but it forbids the use of tribal and
national affiliation to achieve domination over other Muslims.”12
Narrow nationalisms and extreme nationalism did not serve the Western world or
the Middle Eastern world well.13 Nationalism as a doctrine implying a state with only a
certain ethnic group and a single set of customs has failed in most states that adopted it.
Since the post WWI era, nationalism was associated with far-right, fascist, and ultra
nationalist groups. In some cases, exclusively nationalist governments have resulted in
divisive and bitter internal struggles that led to genocide. The current situation in Darfur
and the Kurdish question in the Middle East remain blatant reminders of the dangers of
ethnic nationalism. Western Europe and the United States have adopted increasingly antinationalist policies and pursued state concepts that are friendly in a pluralistic society.
Globalization, international co-operation, and commerce have rendered the narrow sense
of nineteenth century ethnic nationalism obsolete. Perhaps the ideological battle between
capitalism and communism provided an impetus for the modern focus on co-operative
policy rather than national interest-based policy. Regardless, the European Union, out-

11

Kemal Karpat, “The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East,” in Ethnicity,
Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East, ed. Milton J. Esman & Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1988), 35-53.
12
Karpat, 45.
13
Narrow nationalism such as France and Britain’s in the colonial period promotes exclusionary
practices in society and state based on ethnicity. Whereas, extreme would be Hitler’s German nationalism
that actively eliminates all non-nationals as defined by dogma.
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sourcing, and the world economy all suggest the permanent defeat of strong ethnic
nationalism as an ideology of state in the West.
Thus, what does Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism mean if the concept was
being developed in Arab states as Western powers were pursuing a less nationalistic and
plural policy towards the world? Has Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism been
anachronisms from the beginning? The brief answer is Arab nationalism appeared as a
concept not long after European nationalism was affecting European states in the
nineteenth century. In the mid twentieth century Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism were
successful ideologies in providing weak central governments with a claim to validity after
the independence of all Middle Eastern countries from the hegemony of England and
France. The Arabic language provides two words for nationalism that distinguish
between the concept of Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism associated with state
boundaries. Qawmiyya implies ethnic nationalism similar to the concept of volksgiest and
wataniyya implies a state nationalism associated with the nation itself. Arab states
espoused both qawmiyya and wataniyya at different times to mitigate conflicts between
Arab states and other indigenous ethnicities. The shift of the West to pluralistic
nationalistic societies was achieved because many of the states had relied on stable
centralized authority rather than communal affiliations. Whereas, the Arab Middle East
has yet to establish a stable centralized government with the concept of individualism. In
addition, Arab states did not develop federal power that achieved the same authority as in
Europe. Furthermore, in Western Europe ingrained traditions of state building provided
precedents for state building. Stein Rokkan claimed, “The great paradox of Western
Europe was that it developed a number of strong centers of territorial control at the edges
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of an old empire: the decisive thrusts of state formation and nation-building took place on
the peripheries of the political vacuum left by the disruption of the old Roman Empire.”14
Rokkan’s conclusion claimed, “The lesson of the analysis is nevertheless clear: the
European sequence simply cannot be repeated in the newest nations; the new nationbuilders have to start out from fundamentally different conditions, they face an entirely
different world.”15 Consequently, Arab state builders were trapped in an “entirely
different world” between East and West. It was within this context Arab state builders
attempted to define the watan. Arab intellectuals witnessing the demise of the Ottoman
Empire and its gradual subjugation to European colonialism began questioning the
societal factors that had lead to the Islamic world’s lapse in technology and military
tactics. The decentralized tribal affiliations and the traditions of the Umma provide an
efficacious framework for a flexible and inclusive state. However, decentralized states
are generally incompatible with modernization initially and thus Arab intellectuals began
in the mid nineteenth century to push for western style governments. Furthermore, tribal
societies have proven to be easier to manipulate by outside powers since tribal elites view
personal gain to the tribe as a greater ends than a “national” or religious interest.16
If Islam was the primary identity of the Arab masses, why did nationalist
governments take power in almost all Arab states at the end of the mandate system after
WWII? Naturally, the Christian minorities and other pro-western academics in the
Middle East came to associate state formation and progression with the European

14

Stein Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for
Research on Variations within Europe,” in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed.
Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 596.
15
Rokkan, 600.
16
Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 218-221; for ideological background 49-74.
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colonial system. Consequently, pro-western Arab academics from urban backgrounds
became the elite in the majority of Arab states. Colonialism typically created the elite that
undermined colonial power by exposing the colonized to European concepts and
methods. However, in the case of the Arab Middle East some states already had prowestern elite that espoused nationalistic approaches to the Arab state. Sati al-Husri, the
Iraqi education minister in the mandate system, formulated a state based Arab
nationalism within the context of the mandate government. When the mandate system
collapsed, the political power remained in the control of pro-western urban elites who by
the mid-twentieth century inherited the west’s disdain for religious government.
Furthermore, initially the goals of the pro-western Arabs and the Islamic masses did not
mutually exclude the principals of Islamic society.
Pan-Arabism in the mid twentieth century replaced Arab nationalism that existed
from the nineteenth century onward as the dominant Arab intellectual goal. Pan-Arabism
was a logical end to Arab nationalism that focused on the disdain of the mandate system
and the broken promises of the Western powers. Pan-Arabism went against the status quo
and provided legitimacy to Arab intellectuals and elites who challenged Western powers.
Thus, Arab nationalism gave way to Pan-Arabism as means of Arab state solidarity
against threats from Israel and provided security from Western intervention. Pan-Arabism
functioned as a means of providing authority from within the boundaries of the state as
well as providing a pretext for regional state expansion. Thus, it is not surprising that the
three most powerful Arab states eventually adopted Pan-Arab goals as their state
ideologies. Egypt, Iraq, and Syria all used similar Pan-Arab ideologies to gain domestic
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legitimacy and as an ideological pretext for regional dominance.17 Taylor summarized the
Pan-Arab dilemma: “This dichotomy between a national resurgence formulated in
universalistic terms and a nation-building process based on regional entities created a
profound psychological dilemma which has perplexed twentieth-century Arabs and
complicated their political evolution.”18
The initial appearance of Pan-Arabism followed by the idea of politicized Islamic
modernism created a political conflict for legitimacy. Ikhwan al-Muslimin and Nasser’s
free officer movement were examples of Egyptian anti-colonial movements that found
common ground against the old elites and attempted successfully to remove them from
power. These two groups had radically different domestic agendas. Egypt’s rise as the
premier Pan-Arab nationalist power under Nasser created a period of Pan-Arab
dominance and internal suppression of Islamic groups. The Ba’th in Iraq and Syria had
similar issues of legitimacy as a religious minority group amid politically active
majorities in each country. The Alawites in Syria and the Sunni’s in Iraq were
particularly interested in curtailing political identities that were religious or sectarian in
nature. Syria and Iraq promoted the idea of Arab nationalism that required submission to
central state authority. Post WWII, Stable societies in Iraq and Syria had been an elusive
goal, but Pan-Arabism provided the means to justify the centralized state amid political
chaos. The failure of the Pan-Arab movement and the conflict between Islamic
modernisms were a result of the ideological disconnect between the conception of
identity within the Umma and the Arab state. The majority of the Arab citizens continued
to identify with the basic Arab-Islamic civilization although the Pan-Arabists were unable

17
18

Taylor, 108-113.
Taylor, 109.
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to understand that affiliation. Furthermore, Pan-Arab governments never fulfilled the
basic premise of their Western-style leadership that centered on providing social,
economic, and political benefits. Unlike other geographic areas involved in the colonial
system, the Arab Middle East had always been close to Western Europe. Throughout the
Middle Ages Arab Muslims frequently defeated and subdued Western powers. The Arabs
who are part of the proud traditions of the Islamic Empires of the Middle East have had a
long established civilization leading back to pre-Islamic Arabia. For that reason, it was
difficult for any Arab culture to accept foreign domination and manipulation. It was
especially difficult for a culture that has a history of competition with the domineering
power. Furthermore, the Arab elites who have ruled their respective colonial creations
since their independence in the nineteen fifties and sixties all failed to alleviate the basic
problems of their societies. All states continue to face problems with basic building of the
infrastructure, the economy, and the social issues. The increased appeal of the Islamic
fundamentalist identity is by far the most shocking consequence of inadequate
governments in the Arab states.
Thus, the initial question remains; what is the identity of Arabs living in the
Middle East and what role has that identity played in state formation. Does Arab history
suggest that either secular Arabism or Islamism will triumph in determining the Arab
state? Identity in the Middle East was flexible long before the advent of modern
European liberalism. However, the modern battles between secular Arabism and Islam
have become increasingly hostile. No matter the intellectual and political attempts to
bridge the gap between popular Islamism and elitist secularism the ideologies remain
incompatible. Consequently, Pan-Arab identity never supplanted the primary modes of

18

Arab identity. The regional ineffectiveness of Pan-Arab ideology did not mean PanArabism was not an effective means of pragmatic elites to maintain authoritarian regimes
in the face of popular Islamism. Thus, the regional aspirations of Pan-Arabism have
failed and have been replaced with the regional aspirations of Islamic modernism. Yet, it
is likely that universalistic ideologies will continue to fail in the Arab Middle East
because of intellectual, political, and social factors that suggested the triumph of the
colonial nation state.
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CHAPTER 2
FRAMING A FALSE DICHOTOMY: SATI AL-HUSRI AND HASSAN AL-BANNA

The ideas of Arab nationalism and Islamic modernism appeared in the Arab
Middle East in the mid nineteenth century. Arab nationalist and Islamic political thought
remained an elitist endeavor until after WWI. The writings of Sati al-Husri and Hassan
al-Banna made the discussion of nationalist and Islamic thought a more public affair.
After the 1950s Islamic modernism and Arab nationalism became embroiled in a political
battle over legitimacy and survival. Islamic modernism has continued to evolve in nonArab and Arab states. However, Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism, as the ethos of the
most powerful Arab states, have increasingly retreated from ideological positions based
on Arab unity. Pan-Arab and Arab nationalism as ideologies had no political claim to
legitimacy in their initial doctrines. Consequently, neither doctrine fulfilled the promise
of modernity. Islamic modernism has attempted to fill the regional universal vacuum left
by the retreat of Pan-Arabism. However, both ideologies have their roots in simplistic
dichotomies constructed during the interwar period aimed at modernizing swiftly.
The first Arab push to define “nationalism” came from small intellectual circles in
Cole Syria, greater Syria, around 1860. The Christian minorities of Cole Syria and
Islamic modernists in Egypt were the first communities to provide answers for the ArabIslamic demise. The Cole Syrian intellectuals believed that a mimic of western concepts
would result in Western like states where Christians could hold greater power and
possibly prevent European Colonial expansion. The Islamic modernists, appearing
around 1870 in Egypt, approached the Arab-Islamic lapse in a more abstract manner and
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suggested that the corruption of Islam from within had resulted in its decline. Some
intellectuals attributed the demise to the Ottoman regime and called for a more traditional
Islam based on core Arab values. Thus, even some of the Islamic modernists had an
implied religious nationalism in their doctrines. Yet, other Islamic modernists suggested
that the Islamic demise was in progress and irreversible. However, Egypt provides an
interesting example of an Islamic state that attempted sincere modernization efforts and
did not submit to the idea of Arab nationalism. Mehemet Ali, an Ottoman Albanian in
Egypt, rose in ranks to establish an eventual Monarchy in Egypt that modernized the
army and attempted limited industrialization. The divergence on his legacy ranges from
the view he “founded” modern Egypt to the perception that Ali’s reign was only enacting
inevitable consequences of the preceding structures and influences. The variety of
opinion on Mehemet Ali is a consequence of his unique identity and his controversial role
as a modernizer. Even though Mehemet Ali laid the foundation for the future state of
Egypt, he was not a nationalist in the western sense. Yet, Mehemet Ali was able to
establish a hereditary rule that lasted until 1952 in Egypt. The survival of Mehemet Ali’s
established regime suggests that nationalist sentiment was not widespread or supported
until the twentieth century.1 The failure of the Ahmed Urabi revolt in the late 19th
century that was the first wataniyya based revolt for Egypt implies the Western ideas of
nation had not penetrated the Arab masses. In addition, the success of the Mahdi revolt in
Sudan and the success of Wahabism on the Arabian Peninsula in the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century suggest that Islam was still the main factor of
motivation among the Arab masses and would persist into the modern period.

1

Summary by Nadav Safran, Egypt in search of Political Community (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1961), 27-33; see 33 for direct effects on society.
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The foundations of the Arab nationalism and Islamic Modernism in the nineteenth
century reveal the initial problems with Arab identity. Arab nationalism, the belief that
Arabs constituted a separate and distinct nation apart from other Muslims, was born in
Christian minority communities in Beirut, Lebanon. The prolific writers associated with
Arab nationalism were products of American and European missionary schools who
indoctrinated students with the ideas of the West. Implicit in the European schools were
the idea of reviving the dormant classical Arabic language. The romantic overtones of
George Antonius in the The Arab Awakening articulate in detail the movement of
missionaries and establishment of western schools in Cole Syria. Antonius writes in the
style of idealized nationalism that revealed itself in statements such as,

But apart from its political and international consequences the upheaval of
1860 deserves to be regarded, in the history of the movement of ideas in
Syria, as the decisive event of the nineteenth century. It awakened men’s
minds to the horrors of their moral stagnation and rekindled the zeal of
those who saw that at root of the country’s tribulations was the sectarian
hatred that thrives on ignorance.2

Regardless, Antonius articulates that sectarian identity dominated the Middle East and
European ideas somehow transcended the sectarian divide. The sectarian divide Antonius
was referring to was religion and its obvious prevention of “modernization”. The
Christian academics of Lebanon and Cole Syria had no need to connect the traditions of
Islam to the idea of building a new Arab nation. Thus, Arab nationalism from its
2

George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Safety Harbor: Simon Publications, 2001), 59.
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inception was a call to abandon the past and adopt new forms of Western identity.
Christians embraced the call to Arab nationalism because it alleviated their subordinate
position in a predominately-Muslim state and reinforced their academic training that was
a result of missionary activity. The economic ties of Christian Arabs with Western
Europe reinforced the Christian resolve to seek western solutions to modernizing the
Arab state.3 Islamic Arabic thinkers of the mid nineteenth century emphasized the
importance of synthesis of Islam with modernity. Yet, Islamic Arabic thinkers were
incapable of abandoning their traditions in favor of adopting European identities.
Consequently, modernity could only be defined through the context of Islam and its
gradual corruption. Albert Hourani articulates the view of Arab Islamic thinkers stating,

They were conscious of belonging to an Ottoman community which
included non-Turks and non-Muslims; they wanted the Ottoman Empire to
enter the modern world; but they were aware also of an Islamic fatherland
in which they were rooted. They set high value on the social morality of
Islam, and tried to justify the adoption of western institutions in Islamic
terms, as being not the introduction of something new but a return to the
true spirit of Islam4

The belief that the Arabs held a “privileged” place in Islam had long preceded any
western ideas of nationalism. Mohammed was an Arab, The Quran was in Arabic, and
the Arabs led the Umma to its golden age when it stretched from Iberia to the Oxus
3

Antonius, 91-93.
Albert Hourani, Arabic thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 68.
4
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River. The Umma supported a structure that rested on tradition and belief in the practice
of Islam as the only path to fair government. The Umma had long held principles similar
to Rousseau’s social contract; welfare of the community, role of justice in society, and
responsibility of the governor to the governed. If the greatest extension and power of the
Umma were realized during a previous era under Arabic rule, it is only a logical
deduction to think that corruption of the initial ideals of the Umma have led Islam to ruin
(or simply less influence). Muslims, unlike their Christian counterparts, had a long
tradition of a religiously and ethnically tolerant culture. The tolerant aspects of Islamic
belief had long been practiced in the Caliphates of both Arabic and Turkic origins.
However, Islam, unlike Christianity, had no separation of church and state. The political
community and the community of believers in Islam had developed together and thus
made the Western conception of a secular state unacceptable to the Islamic tradition in
the nineteenth century. The Islamic modernist movement arose out of the need to
synthesize the concepts of Western modernization with the idea of the Islamic state.5
Two great proponents of the western/Islamic synthesis are Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad Abduh.
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his disciple Muhammad Abduh proposed PanIslamism as a solution to the Western question in the nineteenth century. Both men
believed that reform of Islam from within could revive the Islamic civilization and
counter the western threat. Afghani tended to emphasize the Arab role in Islamic
grandeur and Abduh idealized the role of the states. However, both chose Egypt and the
Arabic language as their main platform of communication.6 The ideas these men put
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forward evolved into an Islamic path that would continue to put more focus on religion.
Muhammad Rashid Rida further emphasized the role of Islam as a method for creating a
modern Umma. Rida’s tradition emphasizes the extension of the Islamic ideas of alAfghani and Abduh.7 Rida’s was concerned with the lapse in the Umma vis-à-vis the
dominant West. Rida continues to maintain the supremacy of the doctrine of Islamic
unity in the face of narrow nationalisms. Rida was a traditionalist as he purported a return
to the values of the Quran and an escape from the corrupt despotic rulers of the Umma.
The Umma for Rida is a unitary community that can gain the advancements of the West
by “behaving” like a European nationalism.8 Yet, unlike his predecessors, Rida puts
further emphasis on Sunni interpretations of Islam and distrusts the Shi’a mysticism and
the Sufi tradition. Ultimately, Rida was not an Arab nationalist because he believed in
the necessary alliance of Turks and Arabs in one Umma to restore Islamic civilization.
Rida’s vision was not exclusionary to the Arabist position of putting emphasis on the
Arab language and role Arabs played in the early Caliphate.
The nineteenth century proved to the Ottoman Empire and many Arab thinkers
that the superiority of the West was undeniable in certain fields. The question became for
these thinkers how to explain the apparent lapse in their culture vis-à-vis that of the West.
Increasingly, the Western powers annexed away the fringes of the Ottoman Empire and it
was only each other’s greed that kept the “sick man of Europe” alive. Britain, France, and
Russia all had their designs on the Ottoman Empire for a multitude of different reasons.
Furthermore, you see an extensive “reach” of each of these powers to associate with
Christian minorities within the Arab Middle East. Therefore, it is not surprising that
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Christian minorities in Syria during the latter half of the nineteenth century began to
develop extremely close ties with Western concepts and methods.9
The Christian Arab minorities would develop an entirely different path for their
vision of the solution to the western question. The Christians having no organic
connection to the concept of the Umma were not hesitant to disregard its claim to social
authority. In addition, the Christians were more apt to comment on and catalogue the
advancements of the West in science and politics. The mission schools of Lebanon and
Syria produced many of the reform minded Christian Arabs who would ultimately come
to govern the secularist Arab nationalist movement.10 The Christians were interested in
creating a society that could mimic the advancements of the West while allowing the
Christians themselves some say in its politics. Since the Christians had no place in the
political authority of a religious Umma, logically they perused an identity that tied them
to the majority of the population where they lived: Arab ethnicity. Christian Arabs argued
that national unity to the watan would transcend unity to a religious identity and promote
freedom and equality. The Christians also argued that a state bound to the concept of a
religion of ultimate truth would only lead to persecution. A state based on absolute truth
in principle cannot have any flaws.11 The Christians wanted equal footing in the political
authority of the state and were consequently willing to mitigate the dominant Islamic
identity in their favor for more expedient forms of identity. The Arab nationalism that the
Christians presented in the nineteenth century would not evolve into Pan-Arabism until
an Iraqi minister codified it as a Pan-Arab vision.

9

Antonius, 79-100.
Antonius, 45-60.
11
Hourani, 245-259.
10

26

Sati Al-Husri was the first academician to articulate Pan-Arab nationalism as a
clear ideology. Arab nationalism before Sati Al-Husri had centered on regional traditions
or religious precepts concerning Arabs position in Islam. Al-Husri borrowed his
nationalist ideals from French and Germanic thinkers. Al-Husri’s adoption of Germanic
nationalism resulted in his rejection of the Ottomanism he once espoused. 12 Al-Husri’s
dogmatic reliance on secular and linguistic national themes laid the foundations of the
Pan-Arab nationalist movement. Furthermore, Al-Husri’s thought about individual liberty
would govern the idea of the national Arab state. William Cleveland translated al-Husri’s
view of freedom as, “To be free does not mean the possession of constitutionalism or
democracy, but of national unity.”13 Al-Husri articulates the ideological precedent for a
unitary state that ignores the popular sentiment of the people. Implicit in al-Husri’s
ideology is the necessity of the legitimacy and secular nature of the national state. AlHusri’s ideology provides a pretext for the dictatorial Pan-Arab regimes that would come
to govern a majority of Arabs. As al-Husri produced his intellectual works, codifying
what would become Pan-Arabism in the inter-war period, at the same time Hassan alBanna was formulating a clear vision of Islamic modernism in Egypt.
Hassan al-Banna articulated the basis for Sunni political Islam in the modern
period like Sati al-Husri had done for Pan-Arabism. However, al-Banna’s movement and
thought began at the grass roots level and evolved into a platform for political action. AlBanna from a collection of fears and orthodoxies targeted secularism and nationalism as a

12

William L.Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and
Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati’ Al-Husri (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 84-89.
13
Cleveland, 96; Summarizing Sati al-Husri from Ma hiya al-qawmiyyah? abhath wa dirasat ‘ala
daw’ al-ahdath wa al-nazariyyat.

27

problem for Arabs and Islam.14 The politicization of al-Banna’s club was the result of the
growing conflict with Zionism in Palestine.15 Al-Banna’s movement, known as the
Ikhwan, outlined a plan that claimed the necessity of Islamic government in the Middle
East. However, al-Banna approached the issue of Islam in a more uncompromising and
fundamental way than the Islamic modernists of the nineteenth century. The three
fundamental aspects of the Ikhwan were the absolute necessity of Islam in life, the
primacy of the Quran and the Prophetic tradition, and the mutability of Islam to adapt to
any context.16 Thus, al-Banna began the Islamic fundamentalist movement that would
govern Sunni interpretations of Islamic revolution. In addition, Al-Banna’s beliefs were a
prelude to the conflict that would latter develop between the Ikwan and the Free Officers
movement. Hamid Enayat states,

Unmoved by changing political realities, men like Banna, Navvab Safavi,
Sayyid Qutb, Ghazzali and Maududi have taken an unequivocal stand
against all varieties of Nationalism: linguistic, ethnic, and liberal. For
them, resistance against foreign domination, which can be the only
legitimate ground for such particularistic creeds, does not have to be
formulated in the language of nationalism; Islam possesses enough
ideological and emotional resources to galvanize the masses in cause of
independence. Even patriotism of the vaunted nineteenth-century type is
discarded from the lexicon of these leaders, because the only homeland
they recognize is not the familiar one associated with specific ethnic
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groups, but the global ‘abode of Islam’-though this time called, not by the
traditional term dar al-Islam (abode of Islam), but by the newly –coined
al-watan al-Islami (the Islamic homeland).17

Thus, the obvious collision course between the watan envisioned by al-Husri and alBanna was inevitable in ideological terms. In defining Pan-Arabism and Islamic
modernism the architects of the movements define each ideology in such absolute and
necessary terms that compromise seemed impossible.
Arab nationalism and Islamic modernism split into more religious and more
secular movements. The division of a modern Arab state vision centered on a pro-western
Christian model and a synthesized Islamic model. The sectarian divide that academics in
the nineteenth century tried to alleviate persisted in the proposed solutions to creating a
modern identity. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh would have
ideologically limited taking their conclusions to the religious or the secular extreme.
Islamic-Arabism implied in Al-Afghani’s and Abduh’s thought seemed rooted in the
traditions of the society that they belonged to. Rida’s and the Christians’ views were
more divisive for the modernist movement since Rida focused too much on Sunni Islam
and the Christians emphasized views that were to radical for the Muslim majority. The
political tendencies of extreme Sunni orthodoxy or dictatorial secularism were both
rooted in minority views of the society in which they existed. Most Arabs in the
nineteenth century had a concept of their own importance as a people with an important
language, but they still held allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was
the only Muslim bastion that could stand against the West. The Arab quest to attain par
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with the West was the motivating factor for both movements. As Hamid Enayat states,
“In defining its relationship with Islam, Arab nationalism thus often ends where it started:
with the glorification of Arabism as a commanding value in Islam.”18 The modern results
of separating the two ideologies have produced both secular and religious radicals in the
Arab Middle East. The circular relationship in attempting to qualify Islamic modernism
and Arab nationalism does not succeed because each doctrine demands political authority
to accomplish its goals. However, not all thinkers couched their ideologies in such
divisive Western and Islamic terms. Abd ar-Rahman al Bazzaz was a prime minister of
Iraq who synthesized the concepts of Arab nationalism and Islam. Bazzaz articulated that
although Islam was a universal religion its message and expansion placed in the
responsibility of the Arabs. Furthermore, Bazzaz argued that Pan-Arab nationalism could
not contradict the goals of Islam politically because the Arabs as the creators of Islam
would expand Islam’s power as well. Essentially, Bazzaz glorified the historical role
Arabs played in Islam. Bazzaz concluded that modern pride in the Arab race was not
western but a religious respect for the founders of the Islamic religion.19 Yet, the more
fundamentalist doctrines would have accused him of arousing sectarian sentiment within
the Umma. Bazzaz’s focus on the “Arabic” nature of Islamic traditions gave the Arabs a
revered status within Islam and within Islamic empires. However, Bazzaz’s views could
never reconcile the political competition between Islam and Nationalism.
The doctrinal conflicts between Islam and Pan-Arabism have never been resolved.
Although in the realm of politics, Pan-Arab states have forged temporary alliances with
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religious movements or states to gain regional advantages. Ideologically Arab
nationalism progressed from a regional elitist movement to a transcendent nationalist
movement heavily influenced by Europe. Conversely, Islamic modernism began
attempting to synthesize western achievements with an Islamic tradition. However, the
Islamic fundamentalist abandoned the move to synthesize Western thought through
Islam. Al-Banna and others labeled the western ideas as inept and ultimately only Islam
could guide the watan al-Islami. Al-Banna and others concluded that Islam had already
provided the tools for Arab society to modernize. The historical political events of the
Arab Middle East reflect the doctrinal changes in nationalism and Islam. In addition, the
historical political context provides a means of analyzing larger themes in Pan-Arabism
and Islamic modernism.
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CHAPTER 3
SUCCESS BY ASSOCIATION 1860-1948: ARAB POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
FROM 1860 TO THE MANDATE PERIOD

The Ottoman tanzimat reforms, a set of state reforms in the mid-nineteenth
century, were politically docile for some academics in the Ottoman Empire. Arab
nationalists and Islamic modernists began envisioning radical political change as a means
of modernizing the Ottoman Empire. The tanzimat period had significantly changed some
administrative structures, but the Ottoman Empire malaise continued until its demise.
Specifically, Arab provinces were continually being lost to European powers. North
Africa was the persistent target of French, English, Italian, and Spanish expansion during
the nineteenth century. The failure of Ottoman reforms to produce tangible results and the
emergence of new political identities created a political situation that allowed new
political allegiances to form. The Christian Arab communities were quick to foment new
identities in the wake of the Ottoman collapse. Although from 1860-1900 the idea of a
Pan-Arab nationalism did not exist outside of the academic community, ideas such as
Pan-Turanism and Islamic modernism were being used for legitimacy by the Ottoman
state. Yet, the Ottoman Empire’s use of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism during the
nineteenth and early twentieth yielded little success. Even thinkers such as Al-Afghani,
Abduh, and Rida all participated in efforts to increase Muslim unity through the Ottoman
bureaucracy and promote it on every level. The Islamic modernist movement did provide
a means of effective unity for the multi-national Ottoman Empire. In addition,
charismatic forms of Islamic interpretation such as Wahabism and the Mahdist revolt
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were able to mobilize mainly Arab populations against Ottoman and European interests.
Yet, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism did not save the faltering Ottoman empire. The
association of these two ideas with the failing Empire created a political vacuum that
Arab nationalists were able to fill.
From 1900-1948 Islamic modernism lost validity as a political doctrine as Arab
nationalists dominated mandate governments and political discourse.1 However, Islamic
modernists did not see their goals as separate from the Arab nationalist movements and in
fact participated in nationalist parties. Arab nationalist thought from 1860-1900 was an
elitist doctrine confined to the highest circles of academicians both Christian Arab and a
few Muslims.
The Ahmed Urabi revolt that became the pretext for British occupation of Egypt
in 1882 was an example of Egyptian state nationalism against the domination of foreign
influence. The revolt was centered on state based wataniyya rather than an Arab ethnic
qawmiyya. The rise of Arab nationalism benefited from the defeat of the Ottoman Empire
in WWI. The Husayn-McMahan correspondence, Sykes-Picot, San Remo, and other
agreements formulated the arbitrary boundaries of predominately Arab nations. The new
creations of the post-WWI period have remained nearly identical in the contemporary
Arab political map. However, the Hashemites propelled to the Arab nationalist heroes
through their wartime actions undertook a concise campaign to unite the Arab world.
Sharif Husayn’s revolt and his post-war actions constitute a distinct plan to create a PanArab state. However, the Hashemite plan relied on the Western power it sought to
undermine.
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The fledgling Zionist movement in Palestine under the British mandate provided
the greatest impetus to a unified Arab political front. Ironically, Britain during WWII
invested in developing an Arab League to combat the Axis political overtures in the
Middle East. The Arab league would become the first political body to act on Pan-Arab
ideas and unify around an Arab cause. The establishment of Israel provided the social
agenda for all Arab states, either religious or secular, to galvanize around. Consequently,
the political influence of Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism continued to increase from
1860s to 1947; the Ahmed Urabi revolt, Hashemite revolt, and the establishments of the
Arab league are examples of the increasing idea that Arabs constitute a distinct people
that should have one nation.
The Ahmed Urabi revolt of 1881 was a revolt in response to the racial preferences
inherent in the successors of Mehemet Ali. Raymond Flower stated, “ For the revolution
of 1881 was above all a native Egyptian movement, aimed against the Turkish
‘palatocracy’ which had ruined the country, and directing its hatred also against the
Europeans after the Anglo-French control had come out on the side of the Khedive
Tewfik.”2 The nepotism of the Turkish Khedives and the Circassian officials in Egypt
had provoked a discontent within the army. Native Egyptians began to develop a sense of
national identity and Ahmed Urabi associated his army with the Egyptian national
movement. However, Urabi himself made it clear he did not intend to break the
dominance of Europe in Egyptian financial affairs. Urabi focused on establishing the
army as the protector of the Egyptians. Urabi’s revolt took on nationalistic overtones and
adopted the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians”, but absent was Arab nationalist rhetoric
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from the revolt. Although Urabi entertained individuals from the Hejaz and Yemen, his
revolutionary ambitions did not entail ethnic solidarity. Nadav Safran suggested that the
revolutionaries of Nasser’s movement in 1952 conveniently applied the Arab nationalist
overtones to Urabi’s revolt. Safran claimed, “Yet it remains true that Urabi’s movement
was basically a negative one with no understanding of what the real ailments of Egyptian
Society were or how to cure them. This is, perhaps the reason why it left little trace after
it was suppressed, despite the efforts of the men of the 1952 revolution to rescue it from
oblivion.”3 The Urabi revolt indicated that the idea of ethnic nationalism had yet to
establish itself in the Arab states. Raymond Flower argued that the Urabi revolt was
indicative of a Pan-Arab conscience on the verge of revolution in the Arab Middle East.
However, his research relied on European sources that did view The Urabi revolt through
an ethnic lens. However, Urabi and his followers only co-opted the national party agenda
after their initial army-centered demands were denied and their political position
marginalized. Thus, it seems that Urabi was an Egyptian nationalist by association and
his ideology did not exceed the efficacy of his immediate needs.4 Yet, the ethnic
overtones of Urabi were implicit in the arguments made by his movement. “Egypt for the
Egyptians” implied that Egyptians were not Turks or Circassian. Thus, the implicit
evocations of an Egyptian identity certainly raised the question of, “What constitutes
Egyptian identity?” The lack of ethnic nationalism in Urabi’s Egyptian revolt is
insignificant as Safran suggested. Instead, Urabi’s revolt is significant because it was the
first movement to question the basis of identity in a majority Arab state.
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Sharif Husayn and the Hashemite line are an interesting staring point for the
political affect of Arab nationalist ideas. Sharif Husayn and the Hashemite line held
legitimacy as the caretakers of the Islamic pilgrimage sites and as descendants of the
prophet. The rights to Sharif’s position had been granted in 1908 with the support of the
Committee for Union and Progress (CUP).5 The CUP had pressured sultan Abdul-Hamid
to abdicate the Sultanate by 1910 because it had de-facto control of the Ottoman state.
The CUP professed a doctrine of racial equality for all citizens in the Ottoman Empire,
but the precedent of Turkish dominance and Pan-Turanism never reconciled Arab claims
to authority.6 Thus, before WWI an atmosphere of distrust and conflict continued to grow
between the CUP and Shari Husayn’s own political ambitions and his association with
Arab secret societies provided the pre-text for the first Arab revolt. Thus, when war broke
out in 1914, the Turks sided with the Central powers. For the first time British and Arab
political interests coincided. The British as well as other Entente powers were well aware
that the Sultan’s call to Jihad threatened all British, French, and Russian colonial
possessions. The British began diplomatically suggesting a practical alliance with Sharif
Husayn as a means of preventing the Arab prince’s participation in the call to Jihad.
Husayn, aware of the delicacy of his situation between British and Turkish power, began
finding out the true extent of the possibility of an Arab revolt.7 The Arab secret societies
Al-Ahd and Al-Fatah both supported the idea of an Arab state and indicated as such to
Sharif Husayn’s son Faisal.8 Faisal began conferring with the British through Sir Henry
McMahon in 1915 after a Hashemite Arab kingdom looked like a distinct possibility. The
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Husyan-McMahon correspondence centered on Husayn’s demands for the guarantees of
independent and unified Arab state. McMahon cleverly hedged on every explicit promise
stating the exact location of the Arab state as theory. Thus, the first Arab nationalist
project launched with the ambitions of a Hashemite monarchy and the blessings of
British support. The Arab revolt began in 1916 in conjunction with British forces and
together they defeated the Turkish armies throughout the Arab Middle East. However, the
British and French had already conceived a plan to dismember the fledgling Arab
nationalist movement by dividing the Arab states between the colonial powers.
The Sykes –Picot agreement had already divided the Arab Middle East between
France and England in 1916. The Sykes-Picot agreement was modified by the San-Remo
agreement after WWI due to the turmoil of Russia. Consequently, Britain acquired Iraq,
Trans-Jordan, and Palestine as territories while France got Syria and Lebanon. The Arab
revolt had been an alliance of convenience for the British government to advance its
ultimate goal of defeating the Ottoman Empire and expanding the British Empire. Faysal
accepted a British offer after his defeat to head the newly formed Iraq because his Arabist
leanings made him more acceptable as a candidate to lead the religiously and ethnically
divided country.9 The Arab nationalist movement did not capture the minds of all Arab
citizens nor did the idea of Bilad Al-Sham (Greater Syria), while Muslim identification
divided society. George Antonius claimed, “the preponderant Moslem element…asked
themselves whether it were not better for them …to continue bearing the Turkish rule”10
Rashid Khalidi noted that the revisions of Antonius’ ideas have been widely accepted and
suggested that regional affiliation for Bilad al-Sham was more politically powerful than
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Arab nationalism.11 Thus, the San Remo treaty and the defeat of Faisal in 1918 confined
the expression of Arab nationalism to the functions of state in the mandate system. The
Hashemites became agents for the British Mandate, a position of subservience in Iraq and
Jordan which gave the appearance of legitimacy. Malik Mufti summarized the plight of
the Hashemites and Arab nationalism as,

For the Hashemites, pan-Arabism has never been simply a question of
ideals and still less of short-term tactical considerations; it constitutes their
best avenue for escaping the constraints of parochial interests as well as
the designs of foreign powers and so for achieving the sovereignty that lies
at the heart of their dynastic ambitions. That is why the Hashemites have
so earnestly and persistently sought to dissolve the borders of the postOttoman Arab world.12

Because of the lack of any coherent identity in post-Ottoman Arab states, individuals
such as Sati-Al Husri and Hasan al-Banna were encouraged to formulate their ideas of
Arab nationalism and Islamic Fundamentalism. The Pan-Islamic call to Jihad by the
Ottoman Empire was subdued by the co-opting of the prophet’s descendants. The use of
force by the French to destroy Faisal in Damascus ushered in new occupiers. Arbitrary
lines lay on the sand connoting the new order of foreign domination. However, the
Hashemites adapted to their new role as cooperators in the mandate period even if it were
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a necessity. The reliance on British support to maintain Hashemite rule and the
centralization of authority in Hashemite states suggest that the state identity of the
Hashemite kingdoms was not sufficient to rule in post-WWI Arab creations. The
Hashemites developed a devious game of promoting pan-Arabism to an extent and still
maintaining British support. The placement of Sati Al-Husri in the Iraqi education
ministry was a platform to promote the “German” Pan-Arab agenda. However, questions
concerning the mandate of British-Palestine flared Zionist fears in both Hashemite States
and eroded the validity of Hashemite rule. In addition, the individual egos of the
Hashemite dynasty prevented practical Pan-Arab unity within their monarchical domains.
Malik Mufti states that in Syria for example, “Damascene oligarchs such as President
Quwwatli and Prime Minister Mardam remembered how they had been marginalized by
King Faisal and his retinue during the brief monarchy of 1920 and had no intention of
surrendering Syria’s independent status or the privileged position of Damascus as its
capital city to the Hashemites.”13 However, the Hashemites did find common cause with
other Arab states over Zionism in Palestine. Regardless, the idea that Arab identity
existed above tribal, regional, and religious affiliation was an efficacious means for the
Hashemites and the British leaders to maintain legitimacy. Ironically, although Iraq was
especially prone to sectarian and ethnic rifts, it was subject to a deliberate campaign to
construct an Arab identity through state education. Although Europe had defeated the
Arab nationalist in WWI, they were quick to adopt the idea of Arab nationalism as a
potentially unifying doctrine amid the arbitrary and sectarian creations of the San-Remo
treaty. The Arab League was the first political body to organize and coordinate Pan-Arab

13

Mufti, 47.

39

aims at the inter-state level. It attempted to reverse the impositions of Mandate-system
treaties from the inter-war era.14
The foundation of the Arab League in 1945 was the first political manifestation of
multi-state Pan-Arabism in action. The co-operation of Arab states was beginning to
appear as a genuine political reality to the Arab populations.15 However, the first true test
of the Arab League came during the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948, which resulted in a
humiliating defeat for all Arab nations. After the defeat of 1948, Pan-Arab politics
became temporarily relegated to the periphery of Arab state concern. In effect, the actions
of the Arab states in 1948 revealed a precedent for the future of Pan-Arabism. The 1948
Arab states’ effort in Israel was disorganized, self-interested, and had different goals.
Israel’s birth in 1948 prompted the armies of several Arab nations to declare war on the
new Jewish state. It seemed the goal of the Arab states was to defeat the Zionist threat.
Initially, it appeared as if the Arab league was performing an authentic Pan-Arab action.
However, the reality of the Arab state interaction was much different. The initial success
of the Arab armies was undermined by the territorial aims of different state leaders.16
Consequently, the Israeli Defense Force was able to defeat the Arab armies and humiliate
the Arab league and each Arab state involved. Egypt and the other Arab states that were
involved in the 1948 war began experiencing the growth of political movements to
redefine Arab identity. The history of the Arab league shows the connection that the PanArab agenda shared with British foreign policy goals and the weakness of a coherent PanArab identity to mitigate individual Arab state’s regional goals.
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The British foreign secretary Anthony Eden recognized the strategic importance
of promoting Arab unity to counter-act Axis overtures in the Arab Middle East. The
threat of Axis support had already manifested itself in the form of a failed revolt in Iraq.17
Thus, Britain once again found itself supporting a Pan-Arab movement as a means of
advancing its own foreign policy agenda. However, some Arab states had floated the
ideas of Arab unity organizations in the 1930s, but regional competitions undermined
their efficacy. At the end of the WWII, the growing Zionist threat in British Palestine
created a political atmosphere that made a regional Arab organization possible.18 The
goals of the Arab League were to work towards Arab integration in all aspects of
political, economic, and cultural life. Yet, the Arab League formed amid a politically
insecure period that witnessed the increasing presence of the Zionist threat. The Arab
League by 1948 had taken a clear and unified position against any independent Jewish
state. Thus, after British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 the Arab League tested its
power as inter-state organization.
The countries of the Arab League launched their invasion of Israel upon the
declaration of an Israeli state. The Arab armies were able to hold and occupy Palestinian
land. However, the prospect of a complete Arab victory over Israel seemed unrealistic by
1950. In addition, Hashemite Imperialism unraveled the trust of the Arab intervention
force by annexing part of Palestine. King Abdullah’s regional plans centered on
strengthening his position in Transjordan with total disregard for a greater Arab unity
agenda. In addition, other states pursued self-interested tactics and policies rather than a
coordinated war effort. The lack of Arab coordination led to eventual defeat and failure
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of the 1948 war, which tarnished the Pan-Arab image of the League. The Arab league
after 1948 continued to affect regional economic, cultural, and pragmatic interstate affairs
but never regained the initiative to provide an effective means for Arab unity.19
The period of 1860-1948 witnessed the birth of Arab nationalism, Pan-Arabism,
and Islamic modernism. All three ideologies failed to provide a practical means for either
Arab or Muslim unity. In fact, the colonial creations of the French and British remained
resoundingly strong state entities. The mandate states when confronted with a regional
threat in Palestine continued to operate as individual states and not as a unified Arab
political body. Perhaps, Ahmed Urabi’s vision of “Egypt for the Egyptians” had
triumphed in each mandate creation. Realistically, Arab states were diverse in
governments and ideology. The Wahabism of the Ibn Saud family was opposed to the
Hashemite imperial aims. The Syrian dreams of Bilad al-Sham undermined Pan-Arab
aims. Thus, the grounds for conflict between Arab states were diverse and complex.
Furthermore, the mandate governments had created Arab elites whose life
experiences and ideas were far removed from the fellah of Egypt or the tribesmen of Iraq.
Popular Islamic movements pervaded the Arab society while elitist of the Arab League
and Mandate politics monopolized politics. Furthermore, the Arab nationalist elites had
benefited by the presence of European powers. The French and British both favored
Western-style nationalist thinkers in mandate governments and promoted their policies by
placing nationalists in mandate ministries and posts. The British support of both Sharif
Husayn and the Arab League overtly pointed to the efficacious use Pan-Arabism by the
British authorities. However, King Abdullah was relegated to his throne in Jordan and
Hashemite unionism ceased to be a realistic Pan-Arab goal. The Sheiks through western
19
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economic and security patronage were able to maintain their special status as wealthy oil
monarchs. However, the Arab Middle East did not abandon Arab unity schemes after the
Israeli debacle of 1948. More extreme successors to Sati-Al-Husri formed ideologies that
excluded co-operation with the West and promoted radical Arab unity at any cost. The
Ba’th ideology outlined a clear plan for Arab unity through radical politics and Gamal
Abdel Nasser made Arab unity the primary goal of the Egyptian state. The new Arab
unity schemes of the post-WWII era relied on political force and modernization as
cornerstones to their unity schemes. The dictatorial nature of the Nasser and the Ba’th
would result in a continual conflict with political Islam. Political Islam found itself on the
defensive after WWII as most Arab states adopted a non-friendly policy towards religious
based political organizations. The illusive goal of defining a clear modern Arab identity
in 1948 seemed as unclear as it did in 1916.
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CHAPTER 4
POST-COLONIAL ARAB POLITICS 1949-1956

The Post-colonial Arab world became a hotbed for political revolutions that were
opportunistic and radical. The failure of the Hashemites and the Arab League were
convenient political targets for the new forms of Pan-Arabism. In addition, the Ikhwan alMuslimin became increasingly radicalized in Egypt. The Ikhwan by the mid 1960s
through political organization and action set the precedent for modern fundamentalist
movements. The Pan-Arab and Islamic ideologies were based largely on the arguments
posed by Sati al-Husri and Hassan al-Banna. Al-Banna participated and supported the
Egyptian revolution but was assassinated. After the 1952 revolution, the Ikhwan became
targets of the new political regime. Likewise, al-Husri’s ideas influenced a new
generation of Pan-Arab leaders whose defining characteristic would be their autocratic
devotion to the idea of an Arab state. The new Pan-Arab ideologies that appeared in the
post-colonial period were more radical and autocratic compared to the ambitious
Hashemites and the failed Arab league. Nasserism and Ba’thism were the two definitive
Pan-Arab ideologies of the post-colonial period that embraced radical and autocratic
political doctrines. Nasserism centered on the ability of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s
charismatic leadership to create an Egyptian-lead Arab super-power. The Ba’th was a
political organization that attempted to advance a unity scheme based on social,
economic, and political reform. The policies that the Ba’th and Nasserists implemented
had temporary success but did not create any lasting Arab unity. Both ideologies targeted
Imperialism and foreign meddling as the source of Arab social, economic, and political
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woes. Certainly, the Hashemites and the Arab League had received Imperial support for
their initial agendas. Thus, validating the reasons why Arabs considered the Hashemites
and the Arab League quasi-Imperialist projects. Generally, the Ba’th and Nasserites
abandoned inter-state models of progressive unity in favor of political coercion at home
and abroad using Machiavellian tactics. Even the United Arab Republic (UAR) failed
based on the inability of Syria or Egypt to abandon state interests. The political
movement to unify the Arab states shifted from the traditional Pan-Arab centers of Syria,
Iraq, and Jordan to the new center of power, Egypt in North Africa. Thus, platforms for
regional divisions already existed in the Pan-Arab movement. Yet, Pan-Arabism reached
its political climax during the Nasser era (1952-1970) despite a host of political
difficulties. However, the climax of Pan-Arabism masked several political undercurrents.
Nasser had assumed power in Egypt through dictatorial means and once in power went
on a political campaign to dismantle The Ikhwan. The Ikhwan had nearly half a million
active members in 1949 and over 2,000 active branches.1 The post-colonial Pan-Arab
leaders precipitated a conflict between political Islam and Pan-Arabism through the
absolute forms of power they used. Nasser embodied the use of state authority to repress
expressions of the Islamic Ikhwan al-Muslimin. Thus, the legitimacy of Pan-Arab
autocracy was undermined by mass Islamic sympathy in Egypt. To understand the Arab
political pressures after 1949 it is necessary to examine the Egyptian revolution and its
suppression of the Ikhwan. This will provide a general model and will set an example for
other Arab countries.
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The social climate in Egypt prior to the revolution formulated the Arab political
ideas that would dominate the period 1949-1970. Egypt had well-organized nationalist,
Islamicist and radical political groups. Most groups had overlapping membership and
affiliations, but their common agenda included significant change in Egyptian Society
and the removal of the conservative Wafd government that had many ties to Britain. The
revolution of 1952 redefined Egypt and thus Arab nationalism as inherently antiWestern.2 In the years after 1952, co-operation or association with western powers was
enough to discredit political opponents domestically or regionally. The struggle for
supremacy in Egypt between the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), formally the
Free Officers Executive Committee, and any perceived political competition redefined
Arab politics. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 begins the formation of the new
ideological interpretations of Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism. The history of
the1952 Egyptian revolution signifies the redefinition of Pan-Arabism through the
political climate of pre-revolution Egypt, the personal role Gamal Abdel Nasser played in
the revolution, and the external and internal threats that plagued Egypt.
The pre-revolutionary climate of Egypt was a milieu of radical student groups,
Wafd’s, leftists, Ikhwan, rightist, and nationalists. 3 The historian P.J. Vatikiotis
summarized the atmosphere of pre-revolution Egypt as,

The deeper resentment of European modernity had been encouraged for a
variety of reasons by rival politicians, the Young Egypt Society, The
Muslim Brethren and Fascist agents from Europe. In the meantime, the
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Palestine Question had also come on to the Arab political scene. There
were parallel radical movements in the Fertile Crescent, all of which
assumed an anti-British posture. Disaffection with the slow processes of
political negotiation led to the option for more violent means, and for
armed struggles.4

In the political turmoil preceding the 1952 revolution, the Free Officers movement was a
unified front of eleven powerful army officers who under the leadership of Nasser
represented a vehemently anti-Imperialist agenda. Nasser became a symbol of larger
Arab politics. According to Vatikiotis,

If Nasser then reflects the biography of his age, his generation, with its
anxieties, fears, hopes, and conflicts, his political portrait becomes
relevant. His egoism and will converged with wider communal desires and
aspirations, so that he mirrored the age he belonged to. He and his
associates emerged in 1952 from anonymity and turned on an older
Egyptian political world that had for long ignored or rejected them, and
whose representatives they no longer accepted as rightful rulers of their
country.5
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Nasser wrapped up in the radical political polemics of pre-revolutionary Egypt would
take measures to ensure his total control of the Egyptian political machine through the
Revolutionary Command Council once the revolution took place.
The Egyptian coup on July, 23rd 1952 was a swift affair preceded by intense
internal chaos. The Free Officers renamed themselves the RCC and went on a calculated
campaign to consolidate authority and dictate policy.6 Initially, the RCC appointed a
civilian government lead by Muhammed Nagib to gain legitimacy. Nagib had been a hero
of the 1948 war and was a devout Muslim who was regarded favorably by the Egyptian
masses. However, Nasser lamented the acquiescence of the power of the RCC to
civilians. Yet, the RCC had serious issues regarding the consolidation of authority. The
RCC focused on eliminating political adversaries by late 1952 but hesitated to challenge
the Ikhwan directly. The Wafd, leftist, communists, and other adversary political groups
were purged from the army and targeted for arrest from 1952-1954. However, the
popularity of Muhammed Nagib leads him to challenge Nasser’s authority through a
popular coalition of anti-Nasser political parties. Yet, Nagib misjudged Nasser’s control
of the loyalty of the RCC and by 1954 was arrested as an accomplice with the Ikhwan.
Nasser, after defeating politically his most serious challenger, turned immediately to the
suppression of other political parties. The RCC used arrests, propaganda, and
intimidation to undermine any remaining political opposition to Nasser’s authority. The
Ikhwan had perpetuated disturbances that led to arrests in 1954 as well, but after the
failed Ikhwan assassination attempt on Nasser, the organization faced internal
suppression on an unprecedented scale. Nasser stood as the unchallenged head of the
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Egyptian state and the Ikhwan’s political power dwindled by 1955.7 The end of domestic
strife in Egypt would allow the necessary time for Nasser to refocus his political aims
regionally and internationally.
Post revolution Nasser and the RCC had to define and articulate Egypt’s reason
for existence as a state. The Egyptian state needed a new ideological standard to replace
the antiquated etatism and Islamic norms. Nasser and the RCC used Pan-Arab
nationalism as a panacea to the regional, international, and internal threats that faced
Egyptian society. Regionally Israel was cautious toward the new Egyptian state.
Internationally, Britain and France were skeptical of Nasser’s power and worried about
his motives. In addition, internal Islamic threats persisted in Egypt after 1955 that
undermined Nasser’s authority. Regionally, Pan-Arabism provided the Egyptian state a
number of potential allies and possibly a pretext for regional dominance. Internationally,
Pan-Arabism provided a counter-balance to the dichotomous Cold War world that could
bolster Nasser’s power in foreign affairs. Internally, Pan-Arabism provided a national
purpose to a country that had been ravaged by external and internal disaster for the past
10 years. Furthermore, by 1955 regional threats to the Egyptian revolution from the
Baghdad pact and the increase in British and Turkish influence convinced Nasser of the
need to create a regional Pan-Arab sentiment.8 Nasser’s ambitious regional and
international agenda received a setback from the 1956 Suez Crisis. The details of the
Suez crisis are in latter chapters. The Ikhwan did not fare well in the Egyptian revolution
of 1952 their position by 1955 implies the temporary victory of the Pan-Arab political
sentiment in defining the Arab state.
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The Ikhwan were numerically one of the most dominant parties in Egypt before
the revolution and enjoyed a broad support base from different classes of society.9 The
founding of the Ikhwan in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna was a response to Western
Imperialism, Westernization, and the end of the Caliphate. The pre-revolutionary
activities of the Ikhwan focused on rejuvenating the Dar al-Islam, the abode of Islam, and
building an “Islamic bloc”10to combat challenges of Westernization and colonialism. In
addition, initially Arabism and the Ikhwans’ vision of Islam were compatible.11
Abdelnasser described the pre-revolution attitude of the Ikhwan as, “the tolerant position
of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun towards the notion of Arabism might have been due to the
liberal atmosphere that characterized Egyptian politics in that period and that did not
push for polarization of ideologies”.12 The Ikhwan became a political target in postrevolutionary Egypt because the RCC could not take a risk with a powerful mass
movement that could undermine their authority. After the Egyptian revolution of 1952
political Islam became marginalized in Egypt because of the political battle to control the
revolution and the Ikhwan’s political actions from 1952-1954.
The revolution of 1952 did not immediately empower Nasser and the RCC to
become the de facto heads of the Egyptian state. In fact, the confusion that followed the
revolution and the support of the Ikhwan for the Free Officers movement led to
excitement among the Ikhwan. Richard Mitchell described the Ikhwan’s view of the
revolution as,
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at the moment –given the long association of the army officers
with the Society(which, with a certain vagueness as to details, was now
the common property of the hitherto unknowing membership-at-large) and
the real and potential role of the members in the events of 23 July (which
although not of major importance did dramatize its unique relationship to
the revolution –the Society came to regard the events of 23 July as ‘our
revolution’. From this auspicious beginning flowered the events which led
to the second and more permanent dissolution of the Muslim Brothers.13

Thus, the Ikhwan viewed the revolution and their support of it as legitimizing their claims
to authority and representing the culmination of the battle they began in 1928. The
vilification of the Ikhwan was not a swift affair. Several issues contributed to the
escalation of tension between the RCC and the Ikhwan. Nasser’s enmity towards Hasan
al-Hudaybi, who had replaced Hasan al-Banna, and the Ikhwan’s refusal to participate in
the new RCC government, caused the rift between the two groups. Ideologically the
Ikhwan began agitating for the integration of the Shari’a at the national level. The RCC
did not initially challenge the Ikhwan because their power was needed in support of the
new government. However, the Ikhwan refused the three seats on the RCC and although
Nasser was angered by Hudaybi’s position, he realized the necessity of the Ikhwan’s
support.14 As late as 1953, Nasser and Muhammed Nagib visited the tomb of Hasan alBanna showing their reverence for the assassinated Ikhwan leader.15 The RCC cleverly
portrayed Hudaybi’s actions to suggest he was both anti-revolution and anti-nationalist.
13
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By 1954 Ikhwan was outlawed, the initial crackdown lead to the arrest of 450 members
and left the majority of the Ikhwan functional but operating under a different name.16 The
major conflict between the Ikhwan and Nasser was the Ikhwan’s decision to back
Muhammed Nagib in his struggle against Nasser and the RCC. However, after Nasser’s
triumph in the political struggle against Nagib, Hudaybi reassured the RCC that the
Ikhwan would support the government of Nasser in return for the release of some Ikhwan
prisoners. Al-Ikhwan’s internal problems and the propaganda war with the government
destabilized the organization, which Hudabyi had managed to achieve.17 The inability of
Hudaybi to firmly control the Ikhwan and the resumption of terrorist activities of the
Society lead to their final demise.18 Al-Ikhwan members attempted to assassinate Nasser
in October of 1954 as he gave a speech. Not only was the assassination unsuccessful but
the attempt gave Nasser the opportunity to build his popularity and stature. The
repression that followed the assassination attempt on Nasser included massive arrests,
show trials, and government support for attacks on Ikhwan facilities. By 1955, the Ikhwan
had effectively been destroyed as a viable political competitor to Nasser’s authority.
However, the repression of Ikhwan would only result in a more radical stance of the
organization and provide a political precedent that pitted Pan-Arabism and Islamic
modernism as foes.
The Egyptian revolution of 1952 began as a popular affair lead by a multitude of
groups supporting the aims of the Free Officers movement. However, the RCC and
Nasser had a clear idea of controlling the Egyptian state. The RCC’s battle with the
Ikhwan established a permanent animosity between Arab nationalism and Islamic
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modernism. Although both ideologies continued to pursue similar themes of regional
unity, anti-Western ideas, and anti-Israel policies, they never co-operated to the same
degree again. The Ikhwan became more radical after their repression and the Nasserists
became more emboldened to pursue a regional agenda. In the period after which the
Ikhwan was outlawed by the Egyptian state in 1954, Sayyid Qutb became the ideological
spokesperson.19 Qutb was a fundamentalist who believed that no compromise with
Western doctrines could solve the problems of the Middle East. Consequently, Qutb
criticized any doctrine that sought synthesis of Western ideas and their incorporation into
Islam. Thus, modern fundamentalism embraced Qutb’s conceptions of no compromise
with Western thought because it had been inept at solving the initial problems that beset
Islamic societies.20 Once Islam politicized, it no longer was a viable ideology for PanArab state unity. Qutb abandoned the conciliatory rhetoric towards Pan-Arabism that alBanna had taken towards Pan-Arabism in pre-revolutionary Egypt.21 Nasser’s adopted
Pan-Arab agenda would dictate the universalist approach in the Arab Middle East.
Analyzing Nasser’s policies provides an excellent example of how universal impulses in
Arab foreign policy are responses to perceived external threats and are incapable of
abandoning the interests of the state.
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CHAPTER 5
NASSERISM: 1955-1967 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PAN-ARAB MOVEMENT

Pan-Arabism’s most successful and ambitious period lasted a brief 12 years. The
revolution of 1952 had redefined the Arab movement as an anti-Imperialist, anti-Western,
and anti-Zionist idea. Consequently, Pan-Arabism became an oppositional force to
Western interests in the Middle East. Historically, by 1955 the Egyptian elite’s
acceptance of a Pan-Arab policy was widespread.1 Yet, the nucleus of the Pan-Arab
thought came from Nasser himself for he was concerned with pragmatic application and
not theory.2 Thus, Nasserism entailed a policy of Pan-Arabism as dictated by Egypt under
Nasser’s rule. Nasserism far from being the fulfillment of some inevitable progress of
history displays discernable patterns of the application of universal Pan-Arabism.
Nasserism’s Pan-Arab component (Nasserism will henceforth refer to the Pan-Arab
policies as the Socialist component had a domestic focus) built upon Egypt’s need to
mitigate the danger of external threats. Pan-Arabism represented to Nasser an efficacious
means of combating Zionists, imperialists, and Western incursions. Thus, Nasser could
embark on a regional Pan-Arab agenda and fulfill the stated goals of the Egyptian state.
However, the Six-Day War in 1967 shattered the ability of Egypt to continue the dual
focus of regional Arabism and domestic development. The rise of Nasserism was
accompanied by a series of foreign policy victories for Nasser that reinforced the
universal claims to Pan-Arabism. The rise of Pan-Arabism was attached to Nasser’s
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association of Arab consciousness to regional threats. The demise of Pan-Arabism rested
in its inability to affect true unity and mitigate regional threats.
Nasser clearly states his development of an Arab consciousness due to the
sensitivity of external threats when he stated,

As far as I am concerned I remember that the first elements of Arab
consciousness began to filter into my mind as a student in secondary
school, wherefrom I went out with my fellow schoolboys on strike on
December 2nd of every year as a protest against the Balfour Declaration
whereby England gave the Jews a national home usurped unjustly from its
legal owners.
When I asked myself at that time why I left my school
enthusiastically and why I was angry for this land which I never saw I
could not find an answer except the echoes of sentiment. Later a form of
comprehension of this subject began when I was a cadet in the Military
College studying the Palestine campaigns in particular and the history and
conditions of this region in general which rendered it, throughout the last
century, an easy prey ravaged by the claws of a pack of hungry beasts.
My comprehension began to be clearer as the foundation of its
facts stood out when I began to study, as a student in the Staff College, the
Palestine campaign and the problems of the Mediterranean in greater
detail.
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And when the Palestine crisis loomed on the horizon I was firmly
convinced that the fighting in Palestine was not fighting on foreign
territory. Nor was it inspired sentiment. It was a duty imposed by selfdefense.3

Arab consciousness stemmed from having mutual interests against a common enemy in
Nasser’s mind. Interestingly, Nasser did not mention any common customs or language
but rather associated his Arabness with the “historical” domination of the region.
Arabism was a “duty” of “self-defense” to external threats. Nasser’s adoption of a PanArab policy after the revolution stems directly from external political threats. The
Baghdad pact represented a British and United States backed incursion into the Middle
East by the creation of a NATO style treaty. Although the true intent of the Baghdad Pact
was to secure the Middle East against Soviet expansion through the policy of
containment, The Egyptians were quick to label it as imperialist meddling. Britain,
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq were the key members of the Baghdad Pact and the proWestern head of Iraq Nuri al-Said attempted to convince Nasser to join. Nasser was in no
place to co-operate with the British fresh from a revolution that labeled any British
support as grounds for criticism and treason. Furthermore, Nasser was not going to
submit in principle to the will of Iraq, a smaller Arab country.4 Dekmejian summarized
Nasser’s response as,
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However, it was not until the threat which the Baghdad Pact posed to
Egypt’s leading position in the Arab World that a more definitive and
genuine commitment to Arabism was made by Nasir. Therefore, the final
decision in favor of Arabism was taken in response to an external threat
and against a divided domestic public opinion base where Arabism was
gaining gradual ascendancy. Subsequently, Nasir’s personal identification
with Arabism pushed the remaining supporters of Egyptianism into the
background until the aftermath of the June War.5

Nasser’s turn to Arabism solved a two-part problem by legitimizing Egypt’s platform for
having a major role in regional affairs and providing a means to comment on any regime
against its agenda as a reactionary accomplice of the West. Critics such as the Syrian
Ba’th questioned if even Egypt was an Arab country.6 Nasser’s vocal and public adoption
of Arabism also silenced critics of Egypt’s Arab credentials. The use of propaganda
through Egyptian radio reached thousands of Arabs in other countries and bolstered the
sense that Egypt was at the forefront of a new movement.7 Jordan’s dismal of the British
man John Glubb from the head of the Jordanian military was a response to Nasser’s
intense propaganda attacks.8 Nasser’s resistance to the West continued to bolster his
regional Pan-Arab credentials and validate Pan-Arabism in other political parties. Nasser
supported likeminded Arabs throughout the Middle East and maintained anti-Imperialist
rhetoric against the West and Israel. Furthermore, The Ba’th party membership rose in
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correlation to Nasser’s resistance during the Suez Crisis and the tripartite attack on
Egypt.9 Thus, the success of Pan-Arabism and the perceived triumph in external matters
have a high degree of correlation.
The Suez Crisis resulted from Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal and
subsequent invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France. Nasser’s decision to
nationalize the Suez Canal was based on a series of miscalculations about how Britain
and France would react. However, American political intervention in the Suez Crisis
prevented Nasser’s defeat and strengthened Egypt’s Pan-Arab credentials. Dawisha
summarized Nasser’s motivations for nationalization as,

Infuriated, Nasir, in a major speech a week later, declared that since the
West was unwilling to help finance the Aswan Dam, Egypt had no
alternative but to raise the money on its own. This could only be achieved
by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. A law nationalizing the AngloFrench company followed, with Nasir pointedly reminding his ecstatic
audience that the moment should be cherished not only by Egyptians but
by all Arabs for it was an affirmation of Arab sovereignty, dignity, and
pride, and a victory for the Arabs and their triumphant nationalism over
the perfidious forces of colonialism and Imperialism.10

Nasser was caught completely by surprise when France, Britain, and Israel invaded
Egypt. The Egyptian army put up some resistance but eventually surrendered the canal
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region. The British and French stood poised to topple Nasser’s regime, but miraculously
the United States stepped in to prevent a removal of Nasser from office. The United
States supported Nasser’s regime not out of sympathy for the Pan-Arab agenda but rather
out of resentment at the independent Israeli, British, and French action. Clearly, in the
context of the Cold War America had to be consulted on matters of foreign policy.
Regardless, Nasser was able to turn the Suez Crisis into a resounding regional and
domestic victory.11 The Pan-Arab agenda of Nasser gained a false sense of strength from
the Suez Crisis. Temporarily Pan-Arab sentiment overtook Arabs in Jordan, Syria, and
Iraq. Although Nasser was privately aware of the American role in ending the Suez
Crisis, he publicly took advantage of the public accolades that flowed. The attempt to
capitalize on the temporary Pan-Arab sentiment of the masses in Syrian politics would
precipitate Nasser’s next Pan-Arab action.
The United Arab Republic that existed from 1958-1961 was the only true PanArab union that made it past the diplomatic stage. Neither Nasser nor Syrian politicians
were seriously contemplating union between Egypt and Syria when it took place. Rather,
Syrian politics driven by an intense competition to appear Pan-Arab to the masses
spiraled out of control. As Malik Mufti stated, “The United Arab Republic—that
crowning manifestation of pan-Arab ideals and an object even today of profound
nostalgia in many Arab circles—was in reality the unintended product of a series of
blunders by Syria’s top political leadership. It was, in other words, simply a mistake.”12
Furthermore, Nasser and his advisors had multiple reservations about joining with
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Syria.13 The instability of Syrian politics, the lack of understanding of Syria, and the
factionalized nature of Syrian politics all provided major obstacles for Egypt and Nasser.
Yet, Nasser’s newly anointed mantle of the Pan-Arab hero necessitated that he not back
down from unity with Syria. The fears that underlay the unity of Egypt and Syria would
eventually undo the union in 1961. The naiveté by which the Ba’th party had approached
unity with Egypt was the core issue. Nasser sought to emulate his dictatorial rule of
Egypt in Syria and to eliminate all political opponents. However, Syria’s diverse and
active political groups would not tolerate Nasser’s singular rule indefinitely. As early as
1959, the Ba’th party in Syria was the first political party to disassociate publicly from
Nasser and Egypt over the inevitable inferior Syrian position in the UAR. The politicized
and factionalized Syrian army finally severed ties with the UAR in the coup of 1961.14
Although the organic unity of Egypt and Syria lay in shambles, federated attempts
at Arab unity continued to persist in the early 1960s. Dual Ba’th coups in Syria and Iraq
in 1963 brought a proposal forward for a United Arab State comprising Egypt, Syria, and
Iraq. Learning the lessons of the UAR, the United Arab State was to be a federated union.
Yet, once again, mutual suspicion among the Ba’th and Nasser and issues of leadership
ended the unity talk. Neither, Egypt, Syria, or Iraq was realistically willing to give up
enough sovereignty as prerequisite to creating a federated Arab state.15
As the various unity projects of Arab nationalism failed, Nasser would redefine
the nationalist project in terms that gave him the most Arab credentials. Initially, Nasser
supported the inevitable organic unity of all Arab states, gradually, this view changed to a
federated view of unity. Finally, when federated unity failed Nasser rearticulated Arab
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nationalism in terms of solidarity against Israel. Nasser’s continual redefinition of PanArabism was an attempt to gain the most benefit for his nationalist position. Pan-Arabism
continually embroiled Egypt in other Arab state affairs and antagonized Arab relations.
The civil war in Yemen was an excellent example of a movement manipulating Nasser
into supporting their agenda through promises of mass Arab nationalist support.
However, in reality Egyptians forces fought the overwhelming majority of the battles
against the tribal prince supported by Saudi Arabia. It was the Pan-Arab nationalist
dreams that continued to propel the Egyptian elite and Nasser. The Six-Day war with
Israel decimated any practical vision of Pan-Arab unity and deflated the regional
aspirations of Nasser’s Egypt.16
The Six-Day War was not just a defeat for Nasser’s Egypt, it irrevocably changed
the political orientation of the Egyptian elite and made them focus on domestic issues
rather than a regional ones. Nasser’s dreams of regional dominance and parody with
Western powers had to be abandoned in light of material losses.17 The revenge of 1948, a
cornerstone in Arab policy, had to be abandoned as well. Arab humiliation stemmed from
Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and East
Jerusalem. Yet, just as the Free Officers built their case against the Wafd in 1948, the
universal impulse in Egyptian society did not die in 1967.
Nasser defined Pan-Arabism and Arab sentiment as having its roots in external
threats. Propelled by the Suez Crisis into a false sense of victory, Nasser’s Pan-Arab
agenda secured unity with Syria and threatened “reactionary” Arab regimes. However,
Nasser’s Pan-Arab agenda never entailed true unity. Nasser could not tolerate political
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voices outside of his control and thus made organic unity impractical for any selfinterested state. Furthermore, federated unity always faltered on questions of leadership
and power. Thus, Arab unity began to unravel in the early 1960s due to the contradictions
that lay within the Egyptian regional policy. Iraq and Syria both flirted with regional
federations but remained contemptuous of a repeat of Egyptian “Imperialism” as with the
UAR. Nasser even contradicted himself when he prevented Iraq from unifying Kuwait
back into its borders. Nasser’s appeal seems to lay in the fictional parody he had with
Western powers. After Suez Nasser was the symbol of resistance to the West in its
broadest terms. Political posturing had erased the American intervention to save Egypt
from the Arab mind and propagated the idea of Nasser’s resilience. Yet, after the 1967
Six-Day war, the Egyptian’s appearance of parody with Western powers evaporated
almost overnight. The implicit attachment of Nasser’s Pan-Arabism to the mitigation of
external threats meant that after 1967 its legitimacy lay in ruins. Lastly, the inability of
Nasser to share sovereignty because of his attachment to Egyptian interests undermined
the possibility of Arab union. The universal Pan-Arab approach lived on only in name in
Egypt. However, the Ba’th party maintained a platform of Arab unity into the late 1970s.
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CHAPTER 6
THE BA’TH PARTY: PAN-ARAB DREAMS TO TRIBALIST STATES

The Iraqi Ba’th party was a party that existed in the larger context of Arab
nationalism, Arab socialism, and other Middle East post-colonial revolutionary
movements. Various Iraqi and Syrian leaders to conform to their political doctrine
reformed the initial Ba’th doctrine on more than one occasion. The Ba’th party itself was
not a monolith and had various radical and moderate branches that espoused different
platforms of change in all policy areas.1 The Ba’th party under Saddam Hussein and
Hafiz Al-Assad’s' leadership, transformed Iraq and Syria into efficient one-party regimes
that were able to fill the unstable power vacuums in both countries. The Iraqi and Syrian
Ba’th party were transformed by Saddam Hussein and Hafiz Al-Assad into the most
stable and successful governments in post-independence Iraq and Syria. The
transformations of the Ba’th reveal the inherent problems in the politics of creating the
watan identity. Furthermore, the various transformations of the Ba’th suggest the
extensive role geo-politics of the greater Middle East affected the outcome of local
politics.2 The significance of the Ba’th party in the analysis of Arab identity comes from
an understanding of the rise of the party and the external factors that influenced its
politics.
The Ba’th party historically was never a single-minded entity dominated by one
man. The Ba’th incorporated a host of academic, business, and religious elites who
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competed with each other and espoused different paths of change. The Ba’th party
became the totalitarian in doctrine in Iraq and Syria only after individuals like Saddam
Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad were able to manipulate the party structure skillfully to their
advantage. The divisiveness in the Ba’th party is traceable to the historical splits among
rightwing/leftwing, regionalist/Pan-Arabist, pro-Nasser/anti-Nasser and a host of other
minor divisions. The Iraqi Ba’th did not hold significant political power until 1963 and
came to control all Iraqi politics in 1968. During the founding phases of the Ba’th party,
the Iraqi Ba’th party was a satellite of the Syrian party.3 The ideological divisions of the
Syrian Ba’th party played a major role in the formation of the Iraqi Ba’th party. The Iraqi
Ba’th would eventually inherit the initial Ba’th doctrine as the Syrian Ba’th state
retreated to a regional focus. The Iraqi Ba’th inherited the divisions and instability of the
Ba’th party that led to the atmosphere of suspicion that Saddam used to implement his
authoritarian regime. The history of relevant Iraqi Ba’th party’s structure and
development presents three distinct periods: pre-1963 ideological development, 19681978 consolidation of power, and 1979 to 2003 progressions toward tribal dictatorship.
Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar founded the Ba’th party in Syria in 1943
and both wrote parts of the definitive Ba’th constitution in 1947. The Ba’th party was an
incredibly small entity that did not incorporate any figures of significant political power
initially. The Ba’th party, which translates to renaissance party, did not incorporate
ishtirakiyyah (socialism) or wataniyya (nationalism) in its initial doctrine but came to
incorporate socialist and nationalist doctrines in time. Initially, the Ba’th party was an
abstract party that sought to promote Pan-Arab unity and remove the artificial boundaries
established by the Sykes-Picot and San Remo treaties after WWI. Consequently, the party
3
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promoted ideas without much aim of practical application in its developmental years.
Targets of Ba’th party criticism included Turkey, the idea of Israel, colonial powers, the
West, Iran, and the weakness of the Arab league. The scope of the topics addressed by
Ba’th party dogma suggests the sensitivity of the organization to eternal regional and
international developments. Thus, the impact of the formation of Israel and the Arab
defeat in the Palestinian War that followed gave the growing Ba’th party legitimacy. The
Arab Middle East in the wake of the defeat became disaffected with traditional leadership
and began to turn to revolutionary movements. The revolutions that swept Syria in the
late 1940s and early 1950s prosecuted Ba’th party members and on occasion expelled
them from the country. During the period of persecution, the Ba’th party began to cooperate with other repressed political groups and eventually found common ground with
the socialist parties. Consequently, by 1954 the Ba’th party had merged with Akram
Hourani’s socialist party prompting its first major division.4
The Ba’th Party in Syria increasingly moved to the left throughout the 1950s
because of the tumultuous foreign affairs of the time. The attempt at the United States to
gain access to the Middle East by building defense coalitions through the Eisenhower
doctrine failed as it promoted a heavier reliance on leftist models. The shift of the Ba’th
to the left closer to the communists produced a party crisis, as some remained committed
to non-leftist government types. The divisions were growing within the party but the core
of the party did not disintegrate. The government in Iraq was a target of Ba’th
propaganda during the 1950s because of Nuri al-Saids alignment with the West in the
Baghdad pact. The Iraqi Ba’th party during Said’s regime issued pamphlets commenting
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on the Baghdad pact and promoting Pan-Arab unity. By the 1950s, both the Suez Crisis
and the Czech arms deal of Nasser had pushed the Middle East closer to the Soviet
Union. In addition, the pro-Western stances of Iraq and other Arab states increased cooperation between Syria and Egypt. The impetus that Nasser provided for Pan-Arab
nationalism would be an irresistible opportunity for the Syrian Ba’th party to use to
realize their ultimate goal. Ironically, the Syrian and Egyptian Unity scheme would
irreparably divide the Ba’th party in a schism over the Pan-Arab agenda.5
The United Arab Republic was on the surface the realized dream of the Ba’th
party. In reality, the UAR project would turn the Ba’th into a wataniyya-based party in
Syria. The lasting consequences for Iraq entailed absorbing of the Pan-Arab remainder of
the Syrian Ba’th party. Michel Aflaq’s move to Baghdad in the 1970s solidified the Iraqi
symbolic shift to the remaining Pan-Arab Ba’th. The UAR promised to be a sincere union
that Nasser would control directly through leadership. He would abolish all political
parties and merge them all into a National government. Nasser revealed his dogmatic
agenda when he shifted all power of the UAR to Cairo. Syrian political autonomy was
replaced with dictatorial rule from Cairo. Nasser viewed Syria as a province of Egypt
rather than a country that willing submitted to union. Consequently, Egypt installed in
Syria Egyptian style reforms, laws, and politicians. Meanwhile, the Ba’th party continued
to operate in Beirut and began to feel tension between Nasser’s overbearing policy and
their domestic agenda. The tension surfaced in the expulsion of Abdullah al-Rimawi from
the Ba’th party for his pro-Nasser positions. Once Rimawi’s was expulsed, the divide
between the Nasserites and the Ba'thists worsened. The UAR could not withstand the
regional pressure from Syria for some autonomy, which finally brought its demise in
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1961. A multi-party coup headed by the Ba’th finally separated Syria and Egypt. There
were many underlying ideological reasons for the Ba’th/Nasser split, but Nasser’s
overbearing foreign policy provided the impetus for the Syrian Ba’th to become a
regionally focused party. The regional focus of the Syrian Ba’th would cause more
fracturing within the Ba’th party especially after the dual Ba’th coups of 1963 in Iraq and
Syria.6
In Iraq, the Ba’th party had been weaker than in Syria initially but developed a
more efficacious means of organization. Constant persecution of the Ba’th created an
efficient party that could respond to repression effectively. The party had by the early
1960s developed an association with students and army officers. The Iraq Ba’th, lacking
the experience of union with Nasser, idealized Nasserism and promoted an overtly PanArab agenda. However, Nasser’s propaganda war against the Ba’th party promoted a high
degree of Syrian and Iraqi Ba’th unity in 1963. The Syrian-Iraqi bond was especially
strong near the end of a round of Ba’th talks on the unity of Syria and Iraq. Aref, the nonBa’thist president of Iraq, organized his political coup and ousted the Ba’th from Iraqi
government. From 1963-1966 the Syrian Ba’th divided along regionalist and Pan-Arab
lines made a final division in 1966 with a regionalist military coup in Syria. After the
1966 Ba’th coup, Bitar, a founding member of the Ba’th, renounced his own party and
Aflaq became marginalized. Syria continued to be run by unstable governments. The
Ba’th party finally brought the constant shift between civilian and military rule to an end.
In 1970 Hafiz al-Assad, a non-dogmatic opportunist, took command of the party and
through a coup was able to consolidate his power. Assad succeeded in stabilizing the
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inherently unstable Ba’th by relying on the traditional Alawite tribal source of power in
Syria.
The Iraqi Ba’th would inherit the mantle of the Ba’th old guard and face similar
instability as the Syrian branch of the party. Saddam Hussein ushered in an era of
unprecedented stability beginning in 1979. During 1968-1978 Iraqi, Ba’th politics
became a violent affair because of regional instability and meddling. Iraq maintained the
Pan-Arab agenda in contrast to Syria’s regionalism. The turmoil of 1960s Iraq saw
multiple coups and the Ba’th governments of the early 1960s were displaced from office.
However, the Ba’th would return to power in Iraq in 1968. By the late 1960s, the Iraqi
Ba’th and the Syrian Ba’th were embroiled in a battle for Arab legitimacy. The Syrian
and Iraqi Ba’th competition led to more developed and pragmatic approaches to policy
and government. Consequently, the Iraqi Ba’th became extremely sensitive to external
Middle Eastern affairs in an attempt to outmaneuver Syria.7
Ahmad al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein were the most prominent figures in the post
1968 Ba’th government in Iraq. Bakr remained president until 1978 and Saddam reigned
as second in command. Even though Iraq inherited the Pan-Arab branch of the Ba’th
party, Iraq for most of the early 1970s devoted itself to internal consolidation. The fight
with Kurds in northern Iraq and the continued disputes over the Shatt al-Arab, the
headwaters of the Persian Gulf, with Iran, left Iraq no room for extensive foreign policies.
Furthermore, the bitter propaganda war with the Syrian Ba’th regime left Iraq vulnerable
to external and internal influences. The Iraqi Ba’th stabilized their internal situation when
they signed the Algiers agreement of 1975 with Iran. The Algiers agreement temporarily
stabilized the borders of the Shatt al-Arab and Iran promised Iraq it would stop funding
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the northern Kurds. Once Iraq was free of Iranian infiltration and influence, it began its
regional campaign to undermine Syria. The key topic of contest between Iraq and Syria
became the oil pipeline dispute to the Mediterranean and the Iraqi dues for pipeline use.
Iraq began pursuing an agreement with Turkey to build a new pipeline whose purpose
was to undermine the Syrians. The bitter conflict between Iraq and Syria continued
unabated through the 1970s until foreign events had profound effects on Iraqi-Syrian
relations. In 1978, the Camp David accords between Egypt, Israel, and the United States
brought Egypt into the “Western camp” and alienated the two last anti-Western pro-Arab
regimes. Both Hafiz Al-Assad and Ahmad Bakr revived a long stagnant unity process in
1978 as a means of regime insurance against Israel. Not surprisingly, it was the issue of
Israel in 1973 that lead Iraq during the Middle of the Syrian-Iraqi competition to send
troops to the Syrian front in an effort to halt the Israeli advance. Thus, confirming no
matter the enmity between Iraq and Syria the two states could co-operate on issues that
involved outside powers and mutual interests. The unity scheme revived under Ahmad
Bakr and Hafiz al-Assad began to falter when Saddam Hussein, a staunch advocate of
Iraqi regionalism, dogmatically pushed for immediate union.8 Ahmad Bakr’s sudden
resignation in 1979 and alleged reports of a Syrian plot to overthrow the Iraqi Ba’th gave
Saddam the pretext he needed for his restructuring of the Revolutionary Command
Council.9 Saddam’s “restructuring” would involve his bloody grab on total power in Iraq
that would last well into the late 1980s.
Saddam Hussein through his control of the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC) and the Regional Leadership (RL) branches of the Ba’th party altered its make-up
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to fill positions with increasing numbers of Shi’a and Kurds.10 Hussein’s political moving
to create more diversity in the Ba’th leadership may seem paradoxical to the claim he
created a tribal affiliated leadership. However, the increase in minorities does not mask
the fact that Saddam Hussein placed more people of rural background in the government
than ever before. Saddam gained power by appointing RCC and RL members of rural
origin who had ties to Tikrit. Saddam undermined the traditional Sunni Urban elites of
Iraq and thus placed appointees in power who would be indebted to him. Saddam’s use of
people of agrarian background suggests that he was trying to bypass the ambitious and
educated urban dwellers.
Saddam’s restructuring of the Ba’th party continued in the realm of actively
promoting tribalism in the 1990s. Saddam co-opted shayks and spoke of the unity of
tribes in Iraqi society. Saddam’s gradual return to tribalism was a practical attempt to
restore order and stability in the inherently unstable politics of the Ba’th party.11
Saddam’s shift to tribalism solidified in the Shi’a uprising of 1991 and its bloody
aftermath. The problem for Saddam was how to create a state identity that provided more
stability than Pan-Arabism. Arab nationalist identity had not pacified the Shi’a because
they were more apt to support Shi’a Islamic universalism than secular government. The
embracing of tribal shayks and tribal autonomy create a split system in Iraq that risked
creating division. Yet, the Ba’th party that began becoming “agrarianized” in the 1980s
supplanted urban dwellers in most Ba’th party branches by the mid-1990s. The tribe of
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Tikrit had come into such prominence by the mid-1990s that the Tikriti Arabic dialect
supplanted the normal Iraqi Arabic as a means of elite political communication. Thus,
Saddam had come full circle and replaced the Pan-Arab agenda of the Ba’th with archaic
tribal affinity. Yet, Saddam pursued a policy of political stability since instability had
been the characteristic feature of Ba’th politics since its creation in 1943. Regional
tribalism became the most stable and safe form of governance of Iraq (and to a lesser
extent Syria). The dominance of regional tribalism reveals more about the nature of
identity in the Middle East than Saddam’s Machiavellian ideologies.
The Ba’th split over the UAR divided the universal Pan-Arabists from wataniyya
Ba’th members. The move of the radical branch of the Ba’th to Iraq signifies that Iraq
had adopted universal Pan-Arabism. However, the continued battle for legitimacy and
regional influence only subordinated universal Arabism as an extension of state interests.
Eberhard Kienle described that from 1975-1978, “Iraq but particularly Syria tried to rally
other actors, either by initiating regional alliances that pretended to serve the Arab cause,
or by quickly responding to similar initiatives made by other actors and trying to
influence them in their own interest.”12 Universal Pan-Arabism provided a means for
regional legitimacy, influence, and dominance, like it had for Nasserism which preceded
Ba’thi Iraq and Syria. Interestingly, the Camp David accords of 1978 provided the
impetus for a sincere effort to Arab unity. Syria and Iraq feared an Israel unchained from
the concern of battle with Egypt that could dominate both powers militarily. It seemed
only the fear of outside intervention could trump the interests of the colonial nation state.
However, by the early 1980s Syrian support for the Iranian regime during the Iran-Iraq
war signified any universal Arabism implicit in Ba’th doctrine was a façade.
12
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CHAPTER 7
POST-ARABISM: NEW UNIVERSAL POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

The attempted union of Syria and Iraq in 1978 was one of the last significant
attempts at Arab unity from a Pan-Arab basis. What ideology replaced universal Arabism
in the quest for Arab modernity? Western academics and some Middle Eastern academics
have spoken of the “rise” of fundamental Islam and the conservative religious shift in
Arab society. Much of the academic material produced recently about the West and Islam
has focused on an oversimplified view of a dichotomous world where cultures clash in an
attempt to define society. Geneive Abdo articulately summarized the academic view of
Arab modernity (as it applied to Egypt) best when he wrote,

The common explanation in press accounts and academic circles
for Egypt’s return to its Islamic identity had become cliché: After
experimenting with socialism, Arab nationalism, and capitalism under
successive leaders Gamal Adb al-Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni
Mubarak, a vast majority of Egyptians were left poverty-stricken and
embittered toward the West. The failures of Western-oriented ideologies
and economic development, went the argument, fueled a rejectionist
movement—hence, the nostalgic search for Islamic roots1
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Abdo implies that the academic clichés about Islam and modernity have oversimplified
the complexities of the issue. Abdo argued the academics have created a modern
monolith of Islam and have associated most ideas of Islamic modernism with a
fundamental and violent vision. The Iranian revolution of 1979, the American hostage
crisis, and various notorious terrorist acts carried out in the name of Islam have
perpetuated the monolithic western vision. However, Abdo argues that the academic
focus on violent Islamic resurgence has ignored important undercurrents of the Islamic
movement. Abdo states,

With radicals operating along the fringes, the moderate Islamists set about
building widespread support within the broader society. Unlike the period
of Afghani, and, later Hasan al-Banna and the early days of his Muslim
Brotherhood, contemporary Islam has penetrated deeply into the Egyptian
consciousness. Now, there is a widespread feeling that the cause of
society’s malaise stems primarily from a betrayal from within, rather than
a domineering force from without. Here lies the greatest difference
between the past and current revivals: Islamic thought in the late 1800’s,
and again in the 1940’s and 1950’s, focused on anti-imperialist sentiment
and socio-economic concerns, while contemporary Islamic fervor
emphasizes family values, traditional sexual mores, and cultural
authenticity.2
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Abdo concluded that the reason Islam was changing is because it had abandoned the
polemics of Hasan al-Banna and allowed itself to be defined as an internal struggle by
middle class adherents. Abdo alludes to a significant observation in separating the “new”
Islam from the style invoked by Banna. Prior Islamic fundamentalist movements focused
their attention on universal solutions pertinent to external and internal political
considerations. The “new” Islam was focused on internal struggles of self and morality.
Although the intention here is not gauge the direction of Islam, but to reinforce the idea
that historically from the mid-1800s to recently Islam proposed universalistic solutions
similar to Pan-Arabism as a panacea to Arab society. Banna and Husri framed their
ideological arguments in universal terms as absolute solutions to the process of becoming
modern. The necessity of the universal component in the Islamic modernism proposed by
Banna and the Pan-Arabism proposed by Husri rely upon oversimplifications of historical
trends, society, and external threats. The simplification inherent in universal claims to
achieve modernity in Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism are flawed abstractions. Thus,
irrespective of the rise of Islam in the modern Arab Middle East, potential calls for a
unified Islamic state should be suspect because historically the universal claims of
Arabism were insufficient in trumping the interests of the state. Islamic modernism like
Pan-Arabism does not signify a singular vision for the future of the Middle East. Islamic
modernism encompasses both Sunni and Shi’a versions of a universal vision. The
ideological basis for Islamic modernism provides for similar regional and ideological
divisions that plagued Pan-Arabism. Analyzing Islamic modernism through ideologies,
the application of Islam in Islamic states, and similarities to Pan-Arabism indicates the
universal elements in Islam and how they have a similar basis for failure as Pan-Arabism.
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The ideologues of Islamic modernism had been at work since the early days of the
Egyptian revolution. The Ikhwan lost their battle with Nasser but continued to resist,
publish, and provoke Egyptian society into action. The Ikhwan like Pan-Arabism had a
broad support base and had many branches in a number of Arab states. Sayyid Qutb
articulated his final vision of Islam in 1965-1966, before Nasser put him to death, which
set a precedent for many Islamic thinkers. In addition, in 1969 Colonel Qaddafi’s
revolution in Libya relied on integration of Islamic concepts that evolved into a global
theory of revolution. The Iranian revolution of 1979 figure headed by Ayatollah
Khomeini relied upon Shi’a Islamic traditions and spread fear of exporting the revolution
to Arab states. These three Islamic thinkers framed solutions to Arab states that promised
redemption and dignity. Analyzing Qutb’s, Qaddafi’s, and Khomeini’s ideologies present
three variant ideas of the Islamic approach to universal impulses in Arab society.3
Sayyid Qutb, who inherited Hasan al-Banna’s role of ideological spokesperson
for the Ikhwan, articulated a clear, dogmatic, and concise view of Islam that challenged
secular authority on a global scale. Qutb’s torture under Nasser’s Egyptian regime
embittered him deeply and affected his views. The rigidity and lack of compromise in
Qutb’s works indicate his level of bitterness with secular Western society and the Arab
governments he associated with it. Qutb borrowed ideas from other Muslim thinkers and
organized a clear path for the process of Islamic leadership. Qutb’s key ideas for the
triumph of Islam were jahaliyyah, jamaah, and manhaj.
Jahaliyyah indicates the separation of society from Islamic tenets and divided
societies into two states of being. Historical jahaliyyah indicates that man and society are
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separated from Islam by ignorance. Contemporary jahaliyyah implies the deliberate
meddling of outside powers to limit the influence of Islam.4 The obvious deduction is that
modern jahaliyyah pervades any secular non-Islamic society. Since Islam contains within
it the solutions to all human problems Islamic or non-Islamic, Arab or foreign. These
societies need to be brought under the banner of Islam. Furthermore, the jahaliyyah
critique is extended to any Muslim society that does not fully incorporate Islam into
every facet of existence. Thus, Qutb’s concept of jahaliyyah sets a global standard as the
measure of Islamic success.5
Jamaah was the group of individuals that would facilitate the ascension of Islam.
Yvonne Haddad summarized Qutb’s vision of the jamaah as,

He advocated the necessity of the jamaah, the coalition of committed
individuals who become a vital organic cell of Muslims dedicated to the
materialization of the true Islamic society, one in which the teachings of
the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad impact all aspects of life: political,
economic, legal, as well as cultural.6

Qutb envisioned the jamaah as an isolated unit of society that employed all necessary
actions to encourage the spread of Islam. The ideas of isolation and separation were
based from Qutb’s interpretation of early Islamic and Quranic revelation. Qutb’s message
was that the contemporary Muslims who aspired to be part of the jamaah would behave
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as Muhammad’s earliest adherents. The jamaah would exist only through adopting
“fundamental” Islamic practices that would inherently be opposed to main- stream
society.7
Manhaj is the actual implementation of the plan to instigate universal Islam. The
jamaah by forcing the realization that there are only those who support God and those
who support Satan expose jahaliyya society. Islam and the jamaah, being an extension of
God, inevitably triumph over Satan and institute Islam for all humanity.8
Qutb’s dogmatic and historical necessary “observations” outlined an austere
Islamic ideology that aspired to a universal status. Qutb’s concepts blamed Arab
societies’ woes on their abandonment of Islam and adoption of jahaliyya society. Yet
Qutb prefaced the success of manhaj only on the universal triumph of Islam on a global
scale. Furthermore, no practical implementation of Qutb’s ideas have taken root,
especially since the Ikhwan movement was marginalized politically in Egypt and most
Arab states.
Muammar al-Qaddafi envisioned a universal semi-Islamic solution to the
problems of the Arab Middle East and actually implemented Islamic policies beginning
in the successful Libyan revolution of 1969. Qaddafi’s Islam was a pragmatic approach to
building legitimacy at the domestic level in state where Islamic institutions were
fundamental to authority. The Sanusiyyah, a conservative Islamic group, and the
orthodox ulama that had preceded Qaddafi each had played a role in twentieth century
Libyan politics. However, Qaddafi by the early 1970s made it clear to religious
authorities that his leadership had final say in religious matters. Qaddafi’s Islam was
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nearly the inverse of Qutb’s vision as Islam for Qaddafi was a mutable concept that was
on the cutting edge of promoting nationalism and socialism.9
Qaddafi outlined in his book, The Third International Theory, a universal theory
that was to pose solutions to all third world nations and the Arab world. Qaddafi’s ideas
blended religion with socialism and Islam with nationalism. Although Qaddafi’s ideas
were confined to Libya in respect to reform, the theories he produced proved that Islam
was not a singular “fundamental vision”.10 Lisa Anderson summarized Qaddafi’s impact
as, “Although Qaddafi’s answers in his Third International Theory reflected both his
Libyan roots and his personal experience and were therefore unlikely to satisfy most
Muslims, the moral and political dilemmas they were designed to address were very real
to many in the Islamic world.”11 Yet, Qaddafi proved that the context of the state
determined the values of the ideologies found within the state. Even Islam was subject to
the context of the Arab state if the state had a tradition of religious authority.
The importance of resurgent Shi’a Islam had greater implications for Western
powers than the growth of the Ikhwan or Qaddafi’s defiance in the 1980s. In addition, the
Iranian revolution in 1979 and the growth of Shi’a Islam in southern Iraq and Lebanon
have greater implications for the future of Arab states.12 Iran, although not an Arab
nation, has historically influenced the Shi’a sect of Islam in several Arab states. The
Iranian revolution of 1979, although motivated by a host of issues, adopted similar
themes of anti-Western and anti-Israeli propaganda. The Shah of Iran and his security
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forces the SAVAK were ardent accomplices of the West.13 Thus, the Iranian revolution
adopted similar themes of external threats posed by Western culture or Israeli force to
posit universal Islamic solutions. The Shi’a approach to universalism in Iran displayed
itself best through the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini and general Shi’i tenets regarding
modernity.
Khomeini followed in a tradition of ijtihad, interpretation, of his immediate and
distant predecessors. Ali-Shariati and older thinkers laid the framework for a universal
Islam in that Khomeini operated with such efficaciousness. However, Khomeini
sacrificed the pursuit of self-fulfillment and enlightenment through clerical interpretation.
Instead, Khomeini focused on institutionalizing Shi’ism into an understandable medium
for the majority of Iranian society. Khomeini sought justification for his policies through
the usual polemic of the Arab nationalists citing years of imperialism, Western
intervention, colonialism, and Israeli aggression as a malaise in Iranian society.14
However, Khomeini and his revolution were initially confined to Iran. The importance
that Shi’a modernism bears on Arab universal projects stems from the fact that the
growing Shi’a movements in southern Iraq and Lebanon threaten the status quo. A
general discussion of the four key principles of Shi’a modernism reveals implications that
Shi’ite universalism has for Arab states. Hamid Enayat identified the four key principles
of Shi’a modernism as ijtihad, constitutionalism, taqiyyah, and martyrdom.
Shi’ism brought to the Middle East a religious approach to universalism that had
several historically ingrained practices. Hamid Enayat defined ijtihad as, “Shi’i vitality
can be explained primarily by some of its potentialities for adaptation to social and
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political change. The most essential of these are the principle of ijtihad, or independent
judgment, as a device supplementing the sources of the jurisprudence, and a potentially
revolutionary posture in the face of temporal power.”15 Ijtihad gave Shi’ism the ability to
be interpreted and reformed to fit the needs of its contemporary guardians. The flexibility
of Shi’ism separated it from the uniform Sunni interpretations of Islam. Although Sunni
Islam did have some outlets for re-interpretation, it generally promoted a static view of
Islam and Islamic law. Shi’ism through the principle of ijtihad bypassed the institutional
obstacles to change in Sunni Islam. Consequently, Shi’ism, unlike other Islamic universal
ideologies, was at the forefront of societal change.
The Ulama’s support of Iranian constitutionalism was a key difference in Shi’a
modernism and Sunni modernism. Shi’a modernism was at the forefront of the
constitutional debate in Iran as a method not promoting Westernization but Islam instead.
The “vitality” of Shi’ism is seen in its embrace of constitutional reforms as opposed to
the retroactive political ideas of most conservative Sunni Islamic political doctrines. The
most significant difference being that Sunnis thought synthesis and the past would
redeem their cause and Shi’ite Islam actively interpreted new modern religious ideas.16
Taqiyyah is one of the most widely known Shi’ite practices. The West and
Sunni’s have interpreted taqiyyah as the shameful act of outward approval but inward
dissent in the name of self-interest. The incorrect political defining of taqiyyah has been
more useful for the enemies of Shi’te Islam than describing an actual political practice.
Taqiyyah was a necessary tool of self-preservation when Shi’ism was a ruthlessly
persecuted minority in Islam. However, the modern uses of taqiyyah have been

15
16

Enayat, 160.
A summary of Enayat, 164-175.

80

vigorously debated among Shi’a scholars. The debate has centered on at what point does
taqiyyah become cowardice in the face of external threats to Shi’ism. The ulama have
had difficulty in reconciling the precedence of martyrdom and the practical application of
taqiyyah. The modern interpretation of taqiyyah outlines boundaries of actions that are
unacceptable to feign even if the consequences are dire. Yet, the justifications for these
boundaries are vague and taqiyyah continues to play an important role in Shi’ite
ideology.
Martyrdom is the most notorious and exaggerated tenet of modern Islam.
Martyrdom in Shi’ism traditionally centered on remembering the death of Husayn in
Karbala through ritual and ceremony. The traditional practice had nothing to do with
vengeful violence but rather focused on cathartic weeping in a sign of solidarity with
Husayn. Predominately, Modern Shi’ism is the twelfth Imam interpretation that eulogizes
Husayn and all martyrs in the ceremonies of ashura in Arab states and ta’ziah in Iran.
The cathartic reverence for his martyrdom is a key tenet of modern Shi’ism. However,
Sunni Muslims and Shi’ites have reinterpreted Husayn in varying literal contexts that
promote their personal agenda rather than analyze him historically. The result is the
traditional reverence afforded Husayn through ritual has been interpreted as some as
inadequate. Instead Husayn was to provide an example of human sacrifice in whose
footsteps were to be followed.17 Hamid Enayat summarized,

As can be readily seen, the principal aim of the ‘Immortal Martyr’ is the
politicization of an aspect of the Shi’i Imamology which until recent times
was generally interpreted in mystical, lyrical and emotional terms. The
17
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result has been a cautious, but growing tendency among the Shi’i militants
to treat the drama of Karbala as an essentially human tragedy, and concurrently, to avoid regarding Husayn’s heroism as a unique and inimitable
event in history, above the capacity of the common run of human beings.
This tendency is epitomized by Khumayni18

The resounding conclusion of modern Islamic thought is that it is diverse,
regional, and contextual. Qaddafi, Qutb, and Khomeini produced three distinct visions of
a universal Islam that had completely different ideas, platforms, and traditions. All three
men were responding to the problems of their immediate society and each thought his
vision provided an efficacious means to modernize. Consequently, universal Islam is as
much of a construct of Pan-Arab nationalism and continues to be influenced by the
context of the immediate state and the need to legitimize authority. Modern Shi’ism from
its shared minority status and history of persecution has a more universal agenda than
modern Sunni Islam. Sunni Islam, having been a part of most states’ government in the
Middle East until recently, developed more isolated and regional identities. Shi’ism
developed a closer solidarity through the shared heritage of persecution and struggle.
Regardless, modern Islamic ideologies that frame their arguments in universal terms have
extremely large societal gaps to bridge. Shi’ism is still a minority within the Arab Middle
East and the long-term implications for Arab states are limited. Shi’ism would unlikely
impact Arab states other than Lebanon, Iraq, and some Gulf states. Though the potential
for Shi’ite power there is strong, it is doubtful that Shi’ism would propose such a
universal Islam as to incorporate their Sunni neighbors. Islam has only begun to
18
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challenge the status-quo in the Arab Middle East. Although the power of Islam is
unquestionable in Arab society, it is doubtful the universal solutions proposed by modern
Islamic thinkers will escape the context of their state.
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CHAPTER 8
THE WEST AND ISRAEL IN ARAB POLITICS

The definition of “the West” is America, Western Europe, Soviet Union, and their
direct affiliates. Israel fits into the West, as it is the extension of the West in the Arab
Middle East. Although Israel came into existence from the backing of the Soviet Union
and America, Israel developed a special relationship with the Unites States through
political patronage by efficacious political lobbies. The purpose of this chapter is to
clarify the effects of the West and Israel on Arab state formation and not to comment on
the Western-Israeli relationship. In addition, the academic and institutional biases against
the Arab Middle east have a long tradition in Western thought. The modern universal
impulses in Arab society stem from a combination of the adoption of Arab elites of the
Western institutional biases about themselves and the foreign policies of Western powers
and their affiliates.
The Arab Middle East has had a long history of interaction with the West from
them occupying the Iberian Peninsula to being colonies under the mandate system. From
the time the Arabs emerged out of Arabian Peninsula and conquered much of Byzantium
and North Africa, the Arabs and Islam have been viewed with an air of mystique,
suspicion, and antagonism. The Christian polemics in the middle ages only served to
exacerbate differences and demonize the “enemy”. Islam presenting itself as the end to
the cycle of prophecy of the ahl al-kitab, people of the book, only further enraged
insecure Christians and challenged Papal authority. Thus, until the advent of rationalism
in the late eighteenth century much academic time and effort was devoted to outlining the
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Christian-Islamic polemic. However, rationalism ushered in new problems for Islam and
the Middle East, which became the vestige of old and antiquated values. The Arabs in
particular were categorized as tribal backward people incapable of governing themselves
and creating a modern society. However, during the age of Imperial Europe the Arabs
were not unique in their label as incapable of ruling themselves. Yet, other colonial
possessions of the European powers had not once threatened the existence of Christian
Europe. There seems to be a Western subconscious impulse to be extremely fearful of
any Islamic movements. This allows monolithic generalizations about Islam and the Arab
Middle East.1 The Untied States adopted European ideas about the Arab Middle East. For
example, the United States in the early nineteenth century referred to the “Barbary
States” of North Africa. The term barbarian was usually reserved for the teeming masses
of steppe nomads and Germanic hordes that wrought total destruction on the faltering
Roman Empire. The use of “Barbary States” at least signifies that the United States used
fear-induced visualizations of the Arab Middle East similar to Europe. Regardless,
Edward Said, Albert Hourani, Norman Daniel, Hichem Djait, and Amin Saikal have
outlined in detail the historical and political assumptions about the West and Islam. The
common theme of all these academics is that misconceived notions of the “other” in
Western thought govern the West’s interaction with Arabs. Generally, the historical
assumptions about Islam and Arabs pervade popular society and some academic circles.
However, through the process of the institutionalization of orientalism, the Arab Middle
East has been subject to overt generalizations that reduce them to a monolith of culture
and society. Thus, it is not surprising that western leaning academics and political leaders
adopted the singular Western vision of their own nations and people. For example, the
1
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political simplification of Arab identity into a universal idea stems from Western thought.
Sati Al-Husri’s ideologies and Nasser’s policies both reflect the inherent orientalist
simplifications of the Western orientalist in formulating solutions for Arab society.2
Consequently, on some level Arabs and Middle Easterner Arabs have adopted Western
orientalist institutional biases about themselves and overtly simplified policies and
ideologies to appeal to the “Arab” or “Islamic” masses viewed in universal terms. The
indirect intellectual assumptions about the Arab Middle East governed how the West
viewed the Middle East and the Middle Easterners viewed themselves. However, even
the intellectual and institutional biases did not promote the universal solutions to the
Middle East problems as much as the direct actions of the West and Israel.
The adversarial relationship between the West and the Middle East in the first half
of the twentieth century revolved around the European mandate system that was
discussed in Chapter 3. Since WWII, the relationship between the West and the Middle
East revolved around the Arab-Israeli conflict and the political context of the Cold War.
Thus, a historical analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War provides valuable
insight into the West its interactions in the Middle East. The historical analysis provides a
mean of analyzing the West as the omnipresent force that provides legitimacy to the
universal forces implicit in Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism.
The goal of this section is not to pass moral judgments upon Israel or the Arabs
but rather to asses the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the development of the Arab
states. Israel has been an omnipresent Arab state concern since it was brought into
existence in 1948. The immediate declaration of war by Arab league states and their
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subsequent defeat by Israel had lasting repercussions in Arab state development. Many
Arab foreign, domestic, and regional policies stem from either the result or consequences
of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. A chronological analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict
reveals some trends in the Arab-state response to the issue. The Arab-state generally used
the Arab-Israeli conflict to galvanize regional support for their policies, critique regional
powers, and as a test to judge the success of the current state.3
The existence of Israel in 1948 had been prefaced by an ever-increasing flow of
Zionists entering Palestine since the mid 1930s. The Arab mandate governments were
suspicious of Zionist intentions. Domestic turmoil ensued because of the increase in
Jewish immigration. The proclamation of the Israeli state in 1948 brought immediate
condemnation from the Arab States. The Arab league met to prepare for their first enterstate action. The Arab league’s war against Israel was a disaster and exposed the fallacy
of Arab unity. The Arab states involved were ill prepared to deal with the problem. They
also pursued an independent agenda rather than unified military aims. Consequently, any
material advantage the Arabs had was squandered and Israel emerged victorious. The
immediate consequence of defeat was the discrediting of the Arab league and the
radicalization of political parties in the Arab states. The Free Officers movement and
other revolutionary Egyptian movements sought to reverse the defeat of 1948 as a
cornerstone to their foreign policy. Egypt’s resistance to Israel would continue unabated
using fedayeen raiders on cross border attacks. However, the unstable truce since 1948
would only drive Israel’ desire for security and the need to take more land. The quasi-war
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status between Israel and Egypt would prompt Israeli leadership to collude with the
Western Imperialist powers in their next attack.
The Suez Crisis in 1956 involved Israel, Britain, and France in reaction to the
nationalizing of the Suez Canal, which prompted Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of
Britain, to seek the removal of Nasser from office. Nasser’s radical stance toward Israel
and opposition to Imperialism throughout the region threatened Israeli, British, and
French interests. The three-pronged attack on the Suez reinforced Arab ideas about
Western intervention and proved that Israel was in direct collusion with former Arab
colonizers. The Suez Crisis provided Gamal Abdel Nasser the event he needed to catapult
his Pan-Arab agenda in the regional and on the international level. Although the Egyptian
army was soundly defeated, diplomatic intervention by the United States saved Nasser.
Nasser was able to portray the “victory” in Suez as his personal accomplishment. Arab
states and Arab individuals rallied to his anti-Imperialist Pan-Arab cause and built his
regional status immeasurably. Two examples of Nasser’s new regional status were the
formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 and his increased regional meddling. The
continual accumulation of arms by Syria and Egypt proceeded unhindered through the
1950s and 1960s. Egypt also began heavily supporting the republican side in the Yemeni
civil war in 1962 and although the UAR failed, Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defense
pact in 1966.4
The persistent threat of Israel did not diminish and neither Egypt nor Syria was
any closer to accepting the long-term existence of Israel. However, the Six-Day War of
1967 fundamentally changed Arab-Israeli relations. The consequences of the Six-Day
War reshaped Arab state policy and undermined the political viability of the Pan-Arab
4
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movement. Specifically, the Pan-Arab movement under Nasser had defined victory over
Israel as a prerequisite for the realization of Egypt’s Pan-Arab aims. Nasser even gave
speeches specifically referencing 1948 and 1956 as events that would be reversed in the
face of Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, when Israel crushed Arab armies on three fronts, the
rhetoric of Nasser began to loose legitimacy. The humiliation of the Egyptian
government was so complete that Nasser attempted to resign, although public outcry
returned him to office. Realistically, the Israeli victory in 1967 meant that a reversal of
the 1948 defeat was not possible for Arab states. Also, it meant that Israel was going to
be a long-term presence in the Arab Middle East. Thus, after 1967 the new Pan-Arab
movements were discredited just as the Arab League had been discredited in 1948. Egypt
had to abandon its campaign in Yemen and retract its regional Pan-Arab focus. Nasser’s
death in 1970 led to political leadership of the domestically focused Anwar Sadat.
Furthermore, Hafiz Al-Assad who consolidated power in Syria by 1970 shifted his
policies to a wataniyya focus. Thus, universal Arabism defined in relation to victory over
Israel by its most prominent spokesperson, Nasser, ceased to be an effective tool of state
authority after 1967.5
Although Egypt’s focus after 1967 centered on the state, it did not abandon
conflict with Israel as an immediate concern. By 1969, Egypt had begun a small-scale
border war in the Sinai and continually pressured Israel. The idea of regaining honor and
territory became a significant concern for Egypt. With the death of Nasser in 1970 and
his replacement by Anwar al-Sadat, Egyptian policy remained focused on the state and
closer ties with the Soviet Union were established. Hafiz Al-Assad in Syria was intent
upon regaining the Golan Heights and redeeming Syrian Honor in the wake of 1967. As
5
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early as 1971 Sadat had started to plan a comprehensive attack on Israel aimed at
regaining the Sinai. Sadat was able to secure Syrian co-operation, and in 1973 Egypt and
Syria jointly launched the Yom Kippur War. The Yom Kippur War re-established Arab
dignity and upset Israeli visions of impenetrable military superiority. Yet, militarily the
Arabs suffered a defeat; however, the much needed diplomatic victory propelled both
Egypt and Syria closer to their goals of regaining lost ground. Furthermore, the oil
embargo that Sadat had pre-negotiated before the war proved to be an effective tool at
directing world attention to the affairs of the Arab.6
Sadat had orchestrated the 1973 war not as a final triumph over Israel but as a
regional project aimed at regaining specific territory. Sadat also wanted to initiate some
level of peace with Israel to secure the territory that had been gained. After the superpowers stepped into the conflict, both sides eventually stopped fighting. The peace
process, which began in the aftermath of 1973, led to the 1978 Camp David Accords.
Although Sadat had envisioned total Arab peace with Israel, he found that Egypt was
alone in its peaceful stance. Consequently, Syria began looking for hard-line Arab allies
to continue their conflict with Israel.7
When the Camp David Accords were signed in 1978 between Egypt and Israel, it
shocked the leaders of the Arab world. Syria began extensively more co-operative
measures with its traditional rivals such as Iraq. Furthermore, Syria became more
committed to the Lebanese civil war. Certainly, the Arab loss of Egypt in the struggle
against Israel and the West meant that traditional followers of that polemic would have to
find a new banner. The Camp David Accords did send the resounding message that the
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Arab nationalist project begun by Nasser and outlined in terms of resistance in Palestine
had given way to pragmatic foreign policy based on the needs of the state.8
The United States and the Soviet Union both played significant parts in the drama
of Israeli and Arab relations. The special relationship between the US and Israel only
became closer from 1948 onwards, whereas the Soviet Union patronized multiple Arab
states at different times in hopes of gaining a strategic ally. In addition, the United States
acted independently at times and attempted to constrain Israel in respect to its foreign
policy needs. Arab leaders such as Nasser and Sadat were both aware of the role the
United States could play in taming Israeli policy. The Suez Crisis and the Camp David
Accords showed Egyptian leaders that the United States was capable of mediating fair
and beneficial agreements between Arab states and Israel. The Soviet Union tended to
support any leftist Arab regime with hardware and funds. Generally, the United States
pursued a policy of regional security for Israel and the Soviet Union was on a regional
quest for a permanent ally.9 The end of the Cold War has seen much change in United
States policy, but the policy coheres around protecting Israel and defending United
States’ interest. The absence of the Soviet counter-balance in foreign policy has allowed a
unilateral approach from the US in the Middle East. Furthermore, the US-Israeli alliance
has become closer due to the perception that Islamic radicals threaten both nations.
However, the European Union questions Israeli policies in Palestine and has continually
challenged the United State’s actions in Iraq. The European Union does not have the
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same political power as the Soviet Union did but has continually provided dissenting
opinions to US and Israeli Middle Eastern policies.10
Since 1973 there has not been another major Arab-Israeli war but, instead, a series
of non-state actors such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah,
and al-Fatah continuing resistance to Israel and its existence. Most Arab states abandoned
support of the Palestinian cause in practice (not in rhetoric) in favor of state interest. Iran
and Iraq both found some regional legitimacy in supporting Palestine and Lebanese
resistance groups but only as tools in their regional policy. The continued Arab and
Islamic resistance to Israel reflects the immediate situation of those closest to the state.
Hezbollah has found power in its link with Iran via Shi’a universalism. Whereas, Hamas
has had difficulty in sharing power with the older elite of the PLO. Arab nationalism
found a latent power in defining itself as the continuation of Arab struggle in Palestine
through Nasser. The Palestinian issue no longer drives the universal impulses of the Arab
nationalists. Instead, the Palestinian issue stands to become the rallying banner of Islamic
resurgence and like Arab nationalism will be judged in respect to how effectively Islamic
resurgence can solve the Palestinian issue.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION: UNIVERSAL RESPONSES TO OMNIPRESENT THREATS

Can historians fairly ask whether the Arabs have a cohesive identity or are
modern in terms of state formation? Western historians disagree passionately on the topic
of modernity and what signifies the state of “modernity”. Thus, how can we question
whether the Arab states are approaching an ill-defined phenomenon? Western society
irrespective of the intellectual debates submits to the overall idea of the state and its
function. Generally, the issue of identity is irrespective to the quest for material gain or
individual wants. An overwhelming number of Arabs in the Middle East have been left
out of the material success of the West and repeatedly find themselves under autocratic
and corrupt governments. The universalistic claims of Pan-Arabism and Islamic
modernism have been keys to the door of modernity for over 50 years. The story goes if
the idea of Pan-Arabism or Islamic modernism succeed then the woes of Arab society
will wilt away shortly their after. Universalistic and absolute claims have historically
been brilliant masks for ulterior motives of personal power and autocratic regimes. Thus,
why should the historian expect different motives for the universalism inherent in Islamic
modernism or Pan-Arabism? Both ideologies have been convenient refuges for dictators,
demagogues, and disillusioned intellectuals. The identities of the Middle East have been
constantly changing since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but the arbitrary nation
state has remained relatively static. The romantic Pan-Arab nationalism and idealized
fundamental Islam of the twentieth century is to simplistic for the complex loyalties,
ethnicities, and customs of the Arab Middle East. In addition, The “Arab” Middle East
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includes the ethnic minority groups of Kurds, Berbers, Copts, Assyrian Christians, and
others. Thus, why does the universalistic dream of Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism
have such lasting appeal in the Arab Middle East? In part, the West has perpetuated the
universalistic dream of the Arab Middle East by continually manipulating, interfering,
and providing an omnipresent threat that causes Arab states to seek security. The irony of
Islamic modernism and Pan-Arabism is that they have the same end goal in mind in
response to the same social, economic, and cultural issues. Although Islamic modernism
invokes a “fundamental” moralism it promises to solve the pressing issues of Arab States
that Pan-Arabist promised to resolve. Pan-Arabism at the state level has provided a pretext for muddled inter-state affairs that individual dictators have used to claim authority
over other Arabs. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provides an excellent example of a PanArab dictator invading an arbitrary colonial creation in the name of Arab unity. Yet, the
reality was Saddam was using his military might to subdue a weaker neighbor to pay for
an expensive war with Iran. Furthermore, the Arab world condemned Saddam’s act and
helped destroy his occupation force and decimate his army. Thus, had Saddam used a
Pan-Islamic justification as a basis for the inclusion of Kuwait into Iraq, would the base
motivations be any different? Such universalistic simplifications of Pan-Arabism have
been providing excellent Machiavellian guises to inter-state Arab politics since the postcolonial period. What would make the rise of Pan-Islamic modernism any different?
Islam does provide a primary similarity between a majority of an overwhelming
amount of the Arab Middle East. Does the prevalence of Islam and Islamic practice mean
that Islamic modernism will succeed where Pan-Arabism failed? It is doubtful that
Islamic modernism will succeed in the unification of the Arab Middle East into one
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nation-state. However, Islamic modernism that abandons the external prerequisites of
universal unity may be able to reconcile finally the traditional forces in Arab society with
the pressures of the modern era. However, the recent election of Hamas in Palestine and
their battle with al-Fatah suggest that the ideological battle between Pan-Arabism and
Islamic modernism has continued to the political realm. However, it is too early to
suggest that Hamas will remain an uncompromising Islamic movement. The longer the
dictatorial Arab regimes maintain a monopoly on power the more likely radical political
change will ensue. Furthermore, the continued interference of the West in Middle Eastern
affairs continues to provide an excellent motivation for radical political movements just
as Israel did in 1948. In addition, the success of the insurgency in Iraq and the campaign
of Hezbollah against Israel suggest that the tactics of the radical Islamist are more adept
at combating the West (Israel here viewed as an extension of the West). The military
success of the radical Islamic movements only builds their credentials in the Middle
Eastern political arena.
Despite the modern polemics of the West and radical Islam, moderate versions or
democratic versions of Islamic modernism may be able to alleviate the social inequities
of the Middle East if Islamic modernists are willing to compromise. The false promises
of absolute ideologies are tempting for justifications to grasp political authority. As of
yet, it is too early to determine whether Islamic modernists will make the same political
mistakes as Pan-Arabists. However, the triumph of Islamic modernist over the remaining
autocrats in the Middle East is not relevant to the overall argument of Arab state
formation. Irrespective of the ideas that guide the Arab colonial creations, their continued
existence remains a certainty. Because, even if a future Islamic modernist lays claim to a
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universal Islamic state, it can only be from the context of the interest the state. However,
Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism found broad political power in the continued
polemic against Imperialism. Islamic modernism has adopted the Pan-Arab disdain of all
things Western. Nasser’s ability to use Pan-Arabism against the West and other
unfriendly Arab regimes built Egypt’s stature effectively. The GCC states of the Arabian
Peninsula and the Arab dictators have become targets of the new polemic aimed at
Western interference. The status of the GCC will depend on its ability to maintain the
support of the West lest it collapse to Arab or Iranian forces.
The states of the GCC remained a persistent reminder of Western influence and
wealth. Furthermore, the GCC states have recently provided a framework for economic
integration at the inter-state level. The GCC states have increased economic, social, and
defense ties since the early 1980s in stark contrast to the political project of Pan-Arabism.
The GCC states have achieved economic success on parody with some western states and
have modern societies with all the amenities of the West (limited in some cases by
Islamic law applied to the non-ruling class). Thus, why can these states not be held up as
examples to the Arab world as success stories of modernization? The GCC states have
breed resentment rather than respect among the predominant Arab nations. Egyptians
mock the wealthy philanderers of the Gulf state who party in Cairo and revive the old
scapegoat of Western patronage to explain their success.1 It is true that Western states
provided the oil infrastructure that brought the wealth to the GCC states, but those states

1

Sivan Emmanuel, “Arab Nationalism in the Age of Islamic Resurgence” in James Jankowski and
Israel Gershoni ed. Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1997), 207-228.

96

diversified and invested in infrastructure rather than military hardware. The GCC states
are a glaring reminder of Western materialism and the benefits of co-operation at the cost
of submitting national interests. Yet, the material success of these states rather than
inspire other Arab states incite the usual Pan-Arab or Islamic polemic diatribe against
Western co-operation. However, how can Syria and Egypt reconcile their support of the
USA in the first Gulf war? Arab states must acknowledge their own betrayals of their socalled universalistic principles before they can focus on the important developments of
the state. The post-colonial Arab state never shed the idea of the arbitrary nation-state.
Thus, Syria in the UAR was operated like a European colony by Egypt. Likewise, Syria
interfered in Lebanon’s affairs to advance the interest of the Syrian government. Iraq and
Syria’s “battle” to control the Ba’th, Syria’s support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, and the
constant rejection and readmission of states into the Arab league all suggest that
wataniyya interests have trumped Pan-Arab ideology.
Abstractions and polemics aside, the threats posed by Western powers manifested
themselves in direct action and intervention. France and Britain drew the borders of the
Middle East after WWI and Israel modified them in 1948. France and Britain controlled
Arab countries years after WWII and had special patronage based agreements with “cooperative” Arab states. Thus, Imperialism and Imperial designs were a constant source of
concern for Arab political leaders. The persistent meddling of Western powers
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in Middle Eastern affairs has had
direct consequences on Arab society. The modern boundaries of the Arab-states and the
inter-state disputes of these creations are largely problems inherited from the British and
French mandate system. Regardless, the failure of Islamic modernism and Pan-Arabism
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to fulfill their dogmatic premises is not the fault of the West and its affiliates. Political
ideas and powerful political leaders constantly trump an atmosphere of regional hostility
and domestic resistance to their agenda for change. The triumph of the arbitrary Arab
nation-state implied that in the context of the Post-Ottoman world the power-vacuum that
existed was not ready to be filled by a regional Pan-Arab or Islamic state. Even the
perpetual external threat of Israel after 1948 and Nasser’s Pan-Arab agenda could only
manage to join temporarily Syria and Egypt in the UAR. Arguably, the Arab nations
since the collapse of the Soviet Union have become even more isolated. Particularly the
United States has attempted to perpetuate the vision of a singular Arab Middle East
dominated by antiquated and corrupt values who deserves our humanitarian “assistance”.
Also, the call for democracy in some Arab states and the patronage of Arab despots
elsewhere reveal the contradictory regional policies aimed at furthering American
interests. In the absence of the counter-balance of the Soviet Union, the American-Israeli
agenda has become more emboldened since 1991 and imposed a quasi-ultimatum on
Arab states: co-operate or perish. Yet, the current Arab regimes did not provide any
significant resistance to the new Imperial interventions. Thus, the Pan-Arab regimes have
mimicked the behavior of the corrupt governments of the post WWII era. Islamic
modernism and militant Islam get their strength from using the same Imperial polemic
that Nasser used against the Wafd in 1952. Thus, the West is at fault in providing the
political realities that create radical polemics against them.
Viewing the Arab quest for modernity as attempting to alleviate a set of social ills
that beset Arab states because of their socio-political status clarifies the complexities of
Arab modernization efforts. The challenge for the Westerner is to allow the presence of
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Islam into the idea of Arab modernity. Our current society, government, and media
perpetuate the monolithic thinking associated with Islam, Arabs, and the Middle East in
the Western mind. Academia and some writers are attempting to purge the West of that
notion, but their goal is an arduous one (although some academicians perpetuate the
polemics). The false Arab dichotomy of “watan or Umma” framed during the mandate
period has created an adversarial political precedent as it was applied to the Arab state
after WWII. The West as an entity continually provides an impetus to simplistic universal
ideologies in the Middle East by continually exposing the weakness of Arab regimes. The
nation-states of the Arab Middle East have just recently abandoned the elitist universal
impulse to achieve Arab unity. However, the mass appeal of the Islamic movements and
their adherents still threaten the secular regimes.
Yet, even if political Islam does take the reigns of power and invokes a call of
Pan-Islamism in the Arab Middle East, the concerns of the Arab state will prevail. Iran
provides an excellent example of a state that adopted much of the same concerns of the
Shah’s Iran even after the Islamic revolution. Likewise, The Soviet Union adhered
closely to Russia’s previous policy even though it adopted an internationalist communist
agenda. The Arab Middle East beset by the complexities of social disparities, inadequate
economic distribution, and repressive regimes needs a domestic development program.
The Arab states must solve the domestic issues of state before embarking on a regional
integrative program. Arab or Islamic unity may be possible, but only as a willing project
between the current regional Arab states and their peoples. The universalistic responses
to the problems of state will continue to grow in Islamic political responses as the West
continues to intervene in Islamic affairs. The attempt of the West to superimpose a
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singular vision of Islam in the mind of its public continues unabated. The oversimplification of the “clash of civilizations” in our own nation has only exacerbated a
sense that Islam must combat the universal Western threat. Continually defining a
“universal” Islam as the enemy only promotes the adoption of a universal agenda by
radical Islamic minorities who want to portray a simplistic vision to their audience.
Although the universal claims of the Islamic modernist may initiate societal change or
even take power in their respective Arab states, their polemic will not likely yield any
more success than that of Pan-Arabism.
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